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Doctors on the Take: Aligning Tort Law to
Address Drug Company Payments to
Prescribers
LARS NOAH†
I know you think you are being generous, but the foundation of gift
giving is reciprocity. You haven’t given me a gift. You’ve given me
an obligation.
–“Dr.” Sheldon Cooper*

INTRODUCTION
From a very young age, we all learn to crave gifts.
Whether to mark milestones (large and small) or holidays
(major and minor), children become accustomed to getting
stuff that they do not need. At first, some mystery may

† Stephen C. O’Connell Chair, University Term Professor, and Professor of Law,
University of Florida; author, Law, Medicine, and Medical Technology
(Foundation Press 4th ed. 2017).
* The Big Bang Theory: The Bath Item Gift Hypothesis (CBS television
broadcast Dec. 15, 2008) (“The essence of the custom is that I now have to go
out and purchase for you a gift of commensurate value and representing the
same perceived level of friendship as that represented by the gift you’ve given
me. It’s no wonder suicide rates skyrocket this time of year.”). One season later,
the show’s eccentric physicist applauded the message of the classic Dr. Seuss
book “How the Grinch Stole Christmas!” up until the eponymous character’s
change of heart. See The Big Bang Theory: The Maternal Congruence (CBS
television broadcast Dec. 14, 2009).
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surround the gift givers, from Santa Claus, the Easter
Bunny, the Tooth Fairy, a secret admirer on Valentine’s
Day, or strangers dressed up in costumes handing out
candy on Halloween, but with time most gift-givers want to
get some credit for their generosity.
Few of us ever outgrow the desire to receive gifts,
though we try to become adept at giving them as well, while
persons who prefer to opt out of the madness get rewarded
with unkind epithets. Economists occasionally point out the
inefficiency of the process,1 preferring the exchange of cold
hard cash (or gift cards) or endorsing the increasingly
popular “self-gifting” phenomenon,2 but our economy would
suffer mightily if consumers heeded such advice. In certain
contexts, however, the gift relationship has a less benign
reputation, particularly when it involves elected officials or
others charged with making decisions that should remain
free of potential bias.
Doctors like getting goodies as much as the rest of us.
Indeed, some physicians bemoan the fact that patients have
fallen out of the habit of expressing their gratitude in this
fashion.3 Not to worry, the drug industry has stepped in to
fill that void in a big way. In fact, some of the giveaways tie
in nicely with the holidays, including complimentary

1. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, SCROOGENOMICS: WHY YOU SHOULDN’T BUY
PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Why Holiday
Gifts Get More “Ughs” Than “Oohs,” CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2012, at A29; cf. John
A. List & Jason S. Shogren, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment, 88
AM. ECON. REV. 1350, 1354 (1998) (concluding that in-kind transfers do not
necessarily destroy value); Editorial, You Shouldn’t Have. Really., CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 20, 2015, at A28 (explaining other positive attributes associated with the
practice).
2. See Michelle Boorstein, To Thine Own Self: Gift, Too, WASH. POST, Dec.
18, 2012, at C1.
3. See Suzanne J. Koven, The Ungifted Physician, 279 JAMA 1607 (1998).
Although I avoid health care professionals (and the exchange of gifts) like the
plague, one time I gave a physician a signed copy of my casebook (MSRP >
$200) in thanks for patiently attending to members of my immediate family. See
Dedication from author to Catherine Blackband (Apr. 6, 2013) (copy on file with
author).

2018]

DOCTORS ON THE TAKE

857

Christmas trees and bouquets to pass along to that special
someone on Valentine’s Day,4 though lately cash has taken
center stage. The apparent generosity of companies that
sell therapeutic products has encountered a growing chorus
of criticism, however, because these gifts seek to influence
physician choices that affect patient health. Although the
recipients of industry largesse vehemently deny that their
professional judgment could get corrupted so easily, they
fool no one but themselves and may endanger their patients
in the process.5
Part I describes the nature and scope of industry
payments to health care professionals. These have changed
over time as a variety of institutions attempted to crack
down on the practice. First, the medical profession issued
ethical codes, and the industry adopted voluntary
guidelines; next, federal agencies published nonbinding
guidance documents and prosecuted some companies; most
recently, a handful of states and then Congress imposed
reporting requirements and created databases designed to
promote transparency. Nonetheless, manufacturers of
prescription drugs and medical devices continue to find
ways of rewarding physicians for selecting their products,
at times adopting creative tactics to evade the limited
restrictions that currently exist, while researchers keep
documenting the powerful impact of even trivial
inducements.

4. See Chris Adams, Doctors on the Run Can “Dine ‘n’ Dash” in Style in
New Orleans—Drug Companies Pick up Tabs and Make Sales Pitches; Free
Christmas Trees, Too, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2001, at A1.
5. Although normally criticized for driving up costs, promotional campaigns
at the time of initial product launch may expose patients to heightened risks
because unexpected adverse events often turn up during the first few years
after approval. See Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings
and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2218–19 (2002)
(concluding that it may take several years of use to fully characterize a drug’s
safety profile); Gordon D. Schiff et al., Principles of Conservative Prescribing,
171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1433, 1435 (2011) (suggesting that physicians
wait to use a new drug until seven years have passed since its introduction).
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Part II, therefore, suggests a couple of modifications in
tort doctrine to tackle the problem. First, courts could
expand the informed consent duties of physicians to include
disclosures of potential conflicts of interest to patients,
though in practice such a move might not accomplish much.
Second, courts could recognize a novel exception to the
“learned intermediary” doctrine, stripping manufacturers of
an important limitation on their duty to warn when they
have made certain types of payments to prescribers. If
sellers of therapeutic products faced the prospect of having
to supply adequate risk information directly to patients in
such cases, then perhaps they might finally give up on this
dubious method of marketing to health care professionals.
I. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES PAYING
PHYSICIANS TO PRESCRIBE THEIR PRODUCTS
Manufacturers have found a variety of ways to
encourage the selection of their prescription drug products.
In response to evolving ethical codes, industry guidelines,
and occasional prosecution of unlawful kickback schemes,
the methods deployed by pharmaceutical companies have
changed over time. For instance, firms have sponsored
studies that appear to serve no other purpose than getting
physicians into the habit of using a new drug for their
patients. Recently adopted reporting requirements and the
resulting databases have helped researchers more clearly
document the full scope and continued impact of payments
to prescribers.
A. Evolving Industry Practices and Guidelines
For at least half a century, manufacturers have
lavished various types of gifts on health care professionals
in the hopes of generating demand for their products. In an
earlier era, the industry hardly tried to conceal its crass
efforts to purchase the loyalty of physicians.6 The first
6. See, e.g., John C. Nelson, A Snorkel, a 5-Iron, and a Pen, 264 JAMA 742
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ethical codes appeared in 1990, with both the medical
profession and the pharmaceutical industry expressing
their concerns about some of the gifts and prizes offered to
prescribers.7 Although not entirely consistent with one
another and periodically revised over the years,8 the
guidelines now basically allow gifts of modest value (less
than $100 or so) that serve some educational purpose or
benefit patients.9 Nonetheless, because they lack any real
force, these guidelines have managed to stamp out only the

(1990); see also Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA
Regulate Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 314 (1992) (explaining that in 1974 “Senator Edward
Kennedy chaired hearings to examine the pharmaceutical industry . . . [and]
characterized some of the promotional schemes as ‘payola’”); Susan Heilbronner
Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical “Freebies,”
1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 211 (describing Wyeth-Ayerst’s program of giving frequentflyer miles on American Airlines for the selection of its antihypertensive
Inderal® (propranolol): “Doctors who wrote fifty prescriptions would receive a
free round-trip ticket to any destination in the continental United States.”).
7. See Noah, supra note 6, at 316; see also Am. Coll. Physicians, Physicians
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 624 (1990); Am.
Med. Ass’n, Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Editorial, Gifts to Physicians from
Industry, 265 JAMA 501 (1991). For the latest version issued by the American
Medical Association (AMA), see Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 9.6.2,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/gifts-physicians-industry.
8. See, e.g., Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations. Part 1:
Individual Physicians, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 396, 397 (2002) (“Helpful
questions for gauging whether a gift relationship is ethically appropriate
include 1) What would my patients think about this arrangement?”); see also
Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual (6th ed.), 156
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 73, 88 (2012) (including an updated version of this
policy); infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing revisions to the
industry guidelines).
9. See Bill Brubaker, Drug Firms Still Lavish Pricey Gifts on Doctors;
Ethics Debated As Freebies Flow, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2002, at E1 (“Nothing in
the AMA guidelines discourages doctors from accepting as many free
breakfasts, lunches or dinners as they want. . . . [F]ree meals must be ‘modest’
and have an educational component.”); cf. Douglas R. Waud, Pharmaceutical
Promotions—A Free Lunch?, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 351, 352 (1992) (“[T]he idea
seems to be to stick to bribes that are small enough to be swept under the rug if
someone asks questions. . . . Can any physician really believe that patients
would be happy to know that their doctors were taking bribes, no matter what
the size?”).
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most egregious abuses.10
The industry bestows gifts on other parties as well. In
addition to ingratiating themselves with physicians, some
pharmaceutical manufacturers have enlisted retail
pharmacists to help expand market share.11 Although less
common, companies may offer financial enticements to
patients.12 Sponsors of medical research have used similar
inducements, paying physicians to refer their patients to
clinical trials,13 and offering various goodies to subjects
10. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 431
(2002) (“While the payola-style abuses of earlier decades have largely vanished,
sales strategies have become more sophisticated, . . . and detail representatives
continue to ‘wine and dine’ physicians.”); see also Kirsten E. Austad et al.,
Changing Interactions Between Physician Trainees and the Pharmaceutical
Industry: A National Survey, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1064, 1068 (2013)
(finding failures to follow the latest industry code in giving gifts to medical
students, which suggests that “voluntary, self-imposed guidelines may not be
sufficient to end potentially problematic industry marketing practices”); David
Grande, Limiting the Influence of Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts on Physicians:
Self-Regulation or Government Intervention?, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 79, 80
(2010) (“[E]vidence from state gift disclosure laws suggests that many
physicians do not follow the AMA’s ethics guidelines.”).
11. See Gina Kolata, Pharmacists Help Drug Promotions: Some Doctors
Dislike a Link with the Manufacturers, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at A1
(“[O]thers complain that when pharmacists make money on particular choices
of drugs, they are no longer disinterested parties. It is no different, some say,
from the doctor who owns the diagnostic laboratory down the street from his
office and so benefits financially each time he sends a patient there for lab
tests.”).
12. See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing
the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 169–70 (1997) (“[C]ritics
suggest that some recent promotional campaigns, including coupons, rebates,
and offers of free gifts in exchange for visits to physicians, are unseemly.”); see
also Rhonda L. Rundle, A New Wrinkle in Rewards Programs—Restylane, Botox
Offer Incentives for Loyal Patients; Some Raise Ethics Concerns, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 2005, at D1 (describing incentives similar to frequent-flyer programs).
13. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 361–62 (2002)
(explaining that sponsors “may offer financial incentives to family physicians
for recruiting subjects from among their existing patients”); Kurt Eichenwald &
Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999,
§ 1, at 1 (“There are finder’s fees for those who refer their patients to other
doctors conducting research.”); id. (“[T]op recruiters can earn as much as
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upon enrollment.14 Conversely, health insurers sometimes
provide financial incentives to prescribers in order to
discourage the use of expensive brand-name drugs, which
prompted one major pharmaceutical manufacturer to cry
foul.15
In the face of growing scrutiny of pricey gifts, lavish
dinners, and junkets to vacation spots for physicians,16 the
$500,000 to $1 million a year.”); see also Karine Morin et al., Managing
Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 83 (2002)
(The AMA concludes that “it is unethical for physicians to accept payment solely
for referring patients to research studies.”); Roy G. Spece, Jr., Direct and
Enhanced Disclosure of Researcher Financial Conflicts of Interest: The Role of
Trust, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 409, 410 (2013) (calling such per capita payments for
subject recruitment “a bribe of sorts”); id. at 420 & n.38 (noting that these
bounties may reach $10,000 per enrolled subject).
14. See Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials: Conscripting
Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 329–30 & n.2, 358 & n.126
(2010) (discussing inducements for participation in medical studies); Rachel
Zimmerman, Desperately Seeking Kids for Clinical Trials, WALL ST. J., May 29,
2002, at D1 (“To lure young patients, some trials are offering cash, gift
certificates to Toys R Us and Tower records, T-shirts, and use of a Palm Pilot
during the study.”); see also id. (“While it’s illegal to pay physicians cash
‘bounties’ for recruiting children, some researchers are rewarded in other
ways.”).
15. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Doctors Paid to Prescribe Generic Pills, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 24, 2008, at B1 (reporting that one insurer offered physicians “$100
each time they switch a patient from a brand-name drug,” adding that Pfizer
complained about the program to several medical associations, and that the
AMA cautioned that such payments might constitute illegal kickbacks); id.
(Such approaches “are coming under fire for injecting financial incentives into
what some patient advocates and legislators say should be a purely medical
decision. Medical societies are also concerned that such rewards may put
doctors in the ethically questionable position of taking a payment that patients
know nothing about.”). Patients know nothing about such payments only
because participating physicians remain silent.
16. See, e.g., Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script:
How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. e150, at
0623 (2007) (“High prescribers receive higher-end presents, for example, silk
ties or golf bags.”); Robert M. Tenery, Jr., Interactions Between Physicians and
the Health Care Technology Industry, 283 JAMA 391, 392 (2000); Adams, supra
note 4, at A1 (“As the drug industry reaches new extremes in its courtship of
prescribing doctors, the giveaways are flowing freely . . . [including] flowers,
books, CDs, manicures, pedicures, car washes, bottles of wine and cash.”); id.
(“mention[ing] ‘gas ‘n’ go’ events, where a doctor drives up, gets his tank filled
and hears a drug pitch”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, High-Tech Stealth
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American Medical Association (AMA) launched a
campaign—underwritten by drug companies no less—to
remind physicians about the existing ethical guidelines.17
In 2002, the pharmaceutical industry issued a code of
conduct to address interactions with physicians,18 and its
latest revision appeared one decade ago.19 The medical
Being Used to Sway Doctor Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A1
(noting the industry’s justification that “physicians are hungry for information
about” new drugs coupled with a denial that they care much about “a free meal
[at a fancy restaurant] or modest honorarium” of $250-$1,000).
17. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Guidelines on
Gifts to Physicians from Industry: An Update, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 27, 28
(2001) (“[T]he AMA is about to embark on a nationwide campaign to educate
physicians about the importance of reducing and eliminating inappropriate gifts
from industry.”); see also Susan Okie, AMA Criticized for Letting Drug Firms
Pay for Ethics Campaign, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2001, at A3 (“[D]rug companies
often treated doctors to expensive gifts, lavish dinners, trips or cash payments.
Publication of the guidelines helped curb such practices in the early 1990s, but
more recently, studies and media reports have suggested that gift-giving to
doctors by drug companies has increased . . . . [S]urveys indicate many doctors
are unaware that the ethics guidelines exist.”); id. (“Drug companies’ gifts to
doctors typically include such items as pens, notebooks, coffee cups, desk
accessories and tote bags . . . [and] golf balls or golf club covers . . . . The AMA
guidelines state that doctors should not accept gifts . . . if the gift is an incentive
or a reward for prescribing a company’s drug.”).
18. See Scott Hensley, Sorry, Doc, No Dinners-to-Go—Drug Sales Reps Begin
Building a New Marketing Playbook, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at D4 (“The
voluntary code, adopted . . . last week, would eliminate a pizza dropoff for the
staff unless it is accompanied by an in-person educational session.
Entertainment for its own sake would be eliminated entirely.”); id. (“No longer
will [salespeople] be able to chat up a surgeon during intermission at a ‘Lion
King’ performance, or bond side by side in half-court seats at a Lakers game.”);
Jeffrey L. Seglin, Just Saying No to Gifts from Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2002, § 3, at 4; Cyril T. Zaneski, Medical Sales Reps Arrive Bearing Gifts,
BALT. SUN, June 17, 2004, at 1A (“The PhRMA code allows companies to provide
meals and gifts of less than $100 in connection with presentations and sales
visits. The gifts must be something that can be used in a medical office. A
stapler with a drug logo is OK under the code. A box of golf balls or a ticket to a
sporting event is not.”).
19. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA), Code on Interactions
with Healthcare Professionals 13 (July 2008), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org
/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_marketing_code_2008.pdf (forbids offering or
providing anything “in a manner or on conditions that would interfere with the
independence of a healthcare professional’s prescribing practices”); Howard L.
Dorfman, The 2009 Revision to the PhRMA Code on Interactions with
Healthcare Professionals: Challenges and Opportunities for the Pharmaceutical
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device industry adopted a similar code.20 Nonetheless,
payments to health care professionals have continued under
different guises.21
For instance, some manufacturers have sponsored socalled “seeding trials” that purport to elicit information
about patient experiences from prescribers but in practice
seemed to represent little more than financial inducements
designed to encourage physicians to use a new drug or
device.22 “Preceptorships” refer to an arrangement that
Industry in the Age of Compliance, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361, 364–70 (2009)
(highlighting modifications to the industry guidelines that related to gifts and
payments); see also infra note 52 (discussing the effort to end the giving of
trinkets in this latest version of the code); cf. Elizabeth Wager, How to Dance
with Porcupines: Rules and Guidelines on Doctors’ Relations with Drug
Companies, 326 BMJ 1196, 1196–97 (2003) (comparing codes from around the
world).
20. See Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n (AdvaMed), Code of Ethics on
Interactions with Health Care Professionals (July 2009), https://www.advamed.
org/sites/default/files/resource/112_112_code_of_ethics_0.pdf; see also Bonnie
O’Connor et al., Salespeople in the Surgical Suite: Relationships Between
Surgeons and Medical Device Representatives, 11 PLOS ONE e0158510, at 16
(2016) (“The issues and potential pitfalls of excessive industry influence in
medical care and physicians’ treatment decision making are at least as urgent
for implantable medical devices as they are for pharmaceuticals and prescribing
practices, but to date they are far less well studied . . . .”).
21. See Christopher Lee, Drugmakers, Doctors Get Cozier: Gifts Continue,
Contacts Increase Despite Guidelines, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at A3
(“Despite efforts to curb drug companies’ avid courting of doctors, the industry
is working harder than ever to influence what medicines they prescribe,
sending out sales representatives with greater frequency and plying physicians
with gifts, meals and consulting fees . . . .”); id. (“The ties between doctors and
drug companies are deepening despite voluntary guidelines to curb
excesses . . . .”); see also David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug Companies, 351
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1889 (2004) (“[A]s long as such relationships are legal,
the parties involved will face constant temptations to test the limits of
professional and industry codes and government regulations. One can predict,
therefore, that there will be ongoing cycles of scandal and reform for the
foreseeable future.”); Alexander C. Tsai, Policies to Regulate Gifts to Physicians
from Industry, 290 JAMA 1776, 1776 (2003) (“Some observers perceived an
abatement of marketing abuses, but it was short-lived. Within a few years,
commercial detailers and physicians continued to exhibit behavior inconsistent
with the guidelines.”).
22. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, As Doctor Writes Prescription, Drug Company
Writes a Check, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, § 1, at 1 (reporting that Schering-
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allows company representatives to shadow a physician
while treating patients; although the industry defends this
practice as a way of educating members of its sales force,
while the AMA has focused on ensuring safeguards for
patient autonomy and privacy,23 critics view preceptorships
as nothing more than another concealed payoff to
physicians.24 Speaking engagements and consulting
agreements offer more typical mechanisms for funneling
money to prescribers.25 If these payments reimburse
Plough paid physicians “consulting fees” of $10,000 plus a bonus of up to $1,500
per patient enrolled in a purported trial of Intron A, the company’s expensive
hepatitis C drug); Barry Meier, Implant Program for Heart Device Was a Sales
Spur, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A1 (“[A]bout 80 cardiologists nationwide
completed an evaluation run by the Guidant Corporation of one of its
products . . . . In exchange for implanting the lead in three patients and
completing five survey forms, each physician received $1,000 . . . .”); id.
(“Several doctors who took part in the Guidant survey said that they did not tell
their patients about the payments they received.”); Gregory Zuckerman, Biovail
Tactics on Marketing Focus of Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at C1; see also
infra Section I.D (discussing other seeding trials that have come to light).
23. See Bruce Japsen, AMA Says Drug Reps Not Welcome in Exams, CHI.
TRIB., June 18, 2003, at A1 (describing a new policy that requires getting
consent from patients).
24. See id. (“AMA members say patient shadowing is the latest attempt by
pharmaceutical companies to influence physicians’ prescribing habits.”); Melody
Petersen, Suit Says Company Promoted Drug in Exam Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2002, at C1 (“Warner-Lambert’s shadowing program [for Neurontin®]
involved an estimated 75 to 100 doctors . . . . Each doctor was paid $350 or more
for each day they let sales representatives watch as they examined patients,
according to court documents.”); Zaneski, supra note 18, at 1A (“Companies can
pay several hundred dollars a day to physicians who allow reps into the
examining room to learn first-hand about patients’ reactions with
medications.”); AMA Turns Down Proposal to Ease Guideline on Gifts; Doctor
Says Policy Ignored by Many, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2004, at C4 (reporting that
the AMA had decided to defer action on a “proposal [that] would have urged
doctors to refuse payment—sometimes hundreds of dollars daily—for
shadowing, which critics say is meant to influence what drugs are prescribed”);
see also L. Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown, Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives
and the Doctor/Patient Relationship, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 594, 598–
99 (2002) (arguing that preceptorships are unethical).
25. See Hensley, supra note 18, at D4 (“[S]tretching the definition of
consultant, sales reps now recruit local doctors, paying them hundreds of
dollars for an evening meeting in town . . . . A doctor also can earn a consulting
fee by helping a company study a drug or joining a company’s speakers bureau
and lecturing colleagues.”); see also JEROME KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW
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physicians for their time and expertise rather than loyalty,
then they would represent legitimate compensation as
opposed to dubious gifts.26
B. Government Responses to Industry Abuses
Although the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has limited authority over verbal statements made
by sales representatives,27 it enjoys essentially no power to
regulate gifts.28 As a consequence, other actors have become
more involved in trying to supervise the practice. For
instance, a handful of states enacted laws regulating drug

AMERICA’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 13
(2005) (making a quip that prescribers hired in such a capacity may be “asked
to consult on little more than which wine to order”); id. at 29 (offering some
examples of consulting arrangements); Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for the Pizza?
Redefining the Relationships Between Doctors and Drug Companies. 1:
Entanglement, 326 BMJ 1189, 1191 (2003) (“[I]f a company flies 300 doctors to a
golf resort, reimburses their costs, pays them to attend, and educates them
about the company’s latest drug, in order to train them to become members of
the company’s stable of paid speakers, the entire activity would be in
compliance [with PhRMA’s original code].”); Liz Kowalczyk, Drug Firms and
Doctors: The Offers Pour in, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 15, 2002, at A1 (“‘The companies
used to call it coming to dinner,’ [Dr. Martin] Solomon said. ‘Now it’s called
consulting.’”).
26. See Brubaker, supra note 9, at E1 (“The [AMA] guidelines offer some
wiggle room. Doctors who have been deemed ‘advisers’ to drug companies, if
only for a few hours, can accept honorariums and travel perks, for example.
Forest Laboratories calls its advisers ‘advertising/marketing consultants’ in the
confidentiality agreements they are asked to sign.”); id. (“The guidelines do not
rule out five-star treatment—or honorariums—for doctors who provide
‘genuine’—not ‘token’—services as company advisers.”). See generally Fred
Eaton & Jaimee Reid, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall—Evaluating Fair Market
Value for Manufacturer-Physician Consulting Arrangements, 65 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 141 (2010).
27. See Noah, supra note 6, at 317–26.
28. See Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Are Still Giving Gifts to Doctors,
F.D.A. Officials Tell Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A15 (reporting a
statement by one high-level official that the agency “has no jurisdiction to police
such efforts”); see also infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (noting its
limited power over seeding trials). Trinkets bearing brand names qualify as
“reminder ads” that face few FDA restrictions. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(2)(i)
(2017).
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and device industry gifts to physicians.29 The Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) for the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), acting under its authority to
investigate fraud and abuse involving the Medicare and
Medicaid programs,30 issued a guidance document to
address industry marketing practices.31 The OIG guidelines
included an expression of particular concern about seeding
trials.32
29. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119402 (West 2017) (requiring
the adoption of compliance programs that satisfy federal guidelines and
PhRMA’s code); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. § 970.008(1) (2017) (barring essentially
all gifts); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.461 (West 2017) (prohibiting companies from
giving gifts worth more than $50 annually); NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2017)
(requiring adherence to PhRMA’s code); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4632 (2017)
(requiring annual reports); see also Eric G. Campbell, Doctors and Drug
Companies—Scrutinizing Influential Relationships, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1796, 1796 (2007) (noting that Minnesota adopted a reporting requirement in
1993, Vermont joined a decade later, followed by California, D.C., Maine, and
West Virginia); Joseph S. Ross et al., Pharmaceutical Company Payments to
Physicians: Early Experiences with Disclosure Laws in Vermont and Minnesota,
297 JAMA 1216, 1220–22 (2007) (finding the reported data incomplete and
inaccessible).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012); see also Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. &
Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies, or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of the
Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug
and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 296–309 (1999).
31. See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,734–38 (May 5, 2003); Robert Pear,
Drug Industry Is Told to Stop Gifts to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A1
(“[T]he government said that drug makers could not offer incentive payments or
other ‘tangible benefits’ to encourage or reward the prescribing or purchase of
particular drugs by doctors . . . .”); id. (“While the new standards do not have
the force of law, drug makers that flout them are more likely to be investigated
and prosecuted for violations of federal fraud and kickback statutes.”); see also
Susan Chimonas & David J. Rothman, New Federal Guidelines for PhysicianPharmaceutical Industry Relations: The Politics of Policy Formation, 24 HEALTH
AFF. 949 (2005) (discussing the OIG’s drafting process); David M. Studdert et
al., Financial Conflicts of Interest in Physicians’ Relationships with the
Pharmaceutical Industry—Self-Regulation in the Shadow of Federal
Prosecution, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1891, 1898–99 (2004) (discussing the OIG
guidelines); id. at 1891 (“[G]overnment policing in this area is likely to
intensify.”).
32. See OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,735 (“Postmarketing research
activities should be especially scrutinized to ensure that they are legitimate and
not simply a pretext to generate prescriptions of a drug.”). Technically, however,
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Several companies have faced prosecution for violating
the anti-kickback law.33 For instance, Serono pled guilty
after it had offered ten physicians a free trip to the French
Riviera if they increased their use of an expensive AIDS
drug.34 One year later, Schering-Plough agreed to a
substantial fine for paying doctors $500 per patient started
on the company’s hepatitis C treatment.35 More recently,
corporate officers at Insys Therapeutics got charged with
offering kickbacks to physicians for prescribing Subsys®
(fentanyl sublingual spray) more widely than just for its

the OIG guidelines lack the force of law. See id. at 23,731 (“The document is
intended to present voluntary guidance to the industry and not to represent
binding standards for pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); see also Lars Noah,
Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB.
L. REV. 89, 90–93, 113–22 (2014) (explaining that federal agencies increasingly
issue guidance documents even though devoid of any binding effect).
33. See Gardiner Harris & Robert Pear, Drug Maker’s Efforts to Compete in
Lucrative Insulin Market Are Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A14
(“A number of drug companies are running afoul of the anti-kickback law.”); cf.
Cindy A. Schipani et al., Doing Business in a Connected Society: The GSK
Bribery Scandal in China, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (summarizing the
prosecution of similar practices overseas). A few manufacturers agreed to report
their physician payments to settle OIG investigations. See Sachin Santhakumar
& Eli Y. Adashi, The Physician Payment Sunshine Act: Testing the Value of
Transparency, 313 JAMA 23, 23 (2015) (“[B]y 2009, a total of 5 pharmaceutical
companies had begun to disclose payment data in compliance with negotiated
corporate integrity agreements.”).
34. See John Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 44, 46 (“In
exchange [for the trip], each doctor was to write 30 new prescriptions . . . .”);
Eric Lichtblau, Settlement in Marketing of a Drug for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2005, at C1 (reporting that Serono “admitted that it provided what
amounted to illegal remuneration to a group of AIDS doctors by paying for them
to attend a medical ‘conference’ in Cannes, France, in 1999 in exchange for the
doctors’ writing more prescriptions for Serostim”); cf. Zaneski, supra note 18, at
1A (“The U.S. Justice Department says Pfizer provided doctors with weekends
at Florida and Hawaiian resorts and trips to the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta with
little or no medical education provided on the junkets.”).
35. See Jeffrey Krasner, Drug Firm Hit with 3d Big Penalty in Five Years,
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2006, at F1 (“The government cited an illegal kickback
scheme Schering-Plough devised for its drugs used to treat hepatitis C. For each
patient starting treatment with Schering-Plough’s drugs, doctors would receive
up to $500.”).
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approved use in treating breakthrough cancer pain,36 and
those on the receiving end of these unlawful payments faced
prosecution as well.37 Members of the medical device
industry have gotten caught playing similar sorts of
games.38
36. See David Armstrong, Drug Firm Accused of Bribing Doctors, BOS.
GLOBE, Dec. 9, 2016, at C2; Joseph Walker, Fentanyl Billionaire Comes Under
Fire, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2016, at A8; see also Evan Hughes, The Pain
Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 6, 2018, at 55 (recounting the following
explanation of the Insys speakers program by one former sales rep: “the real
target was not the audience but the speaker himself, who would keep getting
paid to do programs if and only if he showed loyalty to Subsys. It was a quid pro
quo . . . .”); id. (“Some prescribers were paid four figures to ‘speak’ to an
audience of zero.”); Katie Thomas, Drug Company Enlists Doctors Under
Scrutiny: Big Payments for Top Painkiller Prescribers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2014, at A1 (Insys “reward[ed] high-prescribing physicians with perks like paid
speaking engagements. And in at least two cases, the company hired the adult
children of top doctors to serve as their parents’ sales representatives.”); id.
(“During a five-month period at the end of 2013, Insys paid 20 doctors more
than $30,000 each in speaking and consulting fees as well as perks like travel
and meals.”).
37. See Benjamin Weiser & Katie Thomas, 5 New York Doctors Are Charged
in a Fentanyl Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2018, at B2 (“Insys paid
the doctors, in some cases more than $100,000 annually, in return for
prescribing millions of dollars’ worth of the company’s painkiller product, the
indictment said. It charged that Insys funneled the illicit payments to the
doctors through a sham ‘speakers bureau’ . . . .”); id. (“Earlier this month,
another top prescriber, Jerrold Rosenberg of Rhode Island, was sentenced to
more than four years in prison after admitting he took kickbacks from Insys.”).
Most of the time, physicians accused of receiving kickbacks from manufacturers
suffer absolutely no consequences. See Tracy Weber & Charles Ornstein, This
Won’t Hurt a Bit, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2011, at G1 (“At least 15 drug and
medical-device companies have paid $6.5 billion since 2008 to settle accusations
of marketing fraud or kickbacks. However, none of the more than 75 doctors
named as participants were sanctioned . . . .”).
38. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235,
236–37 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment granted to the defendant
in a False Claims Act lawsuit where a whistleblower surgeon charged a
manufacturer of orthopedic implants with offering kickbacks to a hospital chain
for purchasing products later billed to Medicare); see also Jason M. Hockenberry
et al., Financial Payments by Orthopedic Device Makers to Orthopedic Surgeons,
171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1759, 1762–63 (2011); Reed Abelson, Possible
Conflicts for Doctors Are Seen on Medical Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at
A1 (“[F]ederal prosecutors have begun to investigate some device makers’ deals
with doctors, trying to determine if they amount to payoffs for using a
product.”); Barry Meier, An Rx for Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B1
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A little-noticed provision in the Affordable Care Act
created a federal requirement that health care providers
report the receipt of anything worth at least $10 (or several
smaller gifts annually if they exceed $100 in the aggregate),
though it excluded the value of free product samples. 39 The
resulting compilation of data has revealed substantial
industry funds flowing to physicians.40 Nonetheless, the
prospect of disclosure apparently made companies
somewhat less likely to offer—and physicians less likely to
accept—covered gifts.41
(reporting that some manufacturers entered into corporate integrity
agreements with the U.S. Department of Justice, which include obligations to
disclose payments); Medtronic Agrees to $23.5 Million Settlement in Kickback
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at B7 (discussing cardiac device seeding trials).
39. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat. 119, 689–96 (2010) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h (2012)). See generally Richard S. Saver, Deciphering the
Sunshine Act: Transparency Regulation and Financial Conflicts in Health Care,
43 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2017). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) promulgated regulations to implement this provision. See Medicare,
Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Transparency Reports and
Reporting of Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 9458
(Feb. 8, 2013) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403(I) (2017)). The database
appears at www.cms.gov/openpayments.
40. See Peter Loftus & Joseph Walker, Doctors, Hospitals Got $6.49 Billion
from Firms in ’14, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2015, at B3; see also Deborah C. Marshall
et al., Disclosure of Industry Payments to Physicians: An Epidemiologic Analysis
of Early Data from the Open Payments Program, 91 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 84, 92–
93 (2016) (comparing payments across different specialties); Genevieve PhamKanter et al., Public Awareness of and Contact with Physicians Who Receive
Industry Payments: A National Survey, 32 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 767, 771
(2017) (finding a wider impact when measured as the percentage of patients
seen by physicians who receive payments); Which Drug Companies Give Gifts to
Your Doc?, DENV. POST, July 14, 2014, at 2C (reporting that an earlier survey
found “nearly 95 percent of U.S. physicians accept gifts, meals, payments, travel
and other services from companies that make the drugs and medical products
they prescribe”); id. (“Although patients will benefit from increased
transparency in coming years, the ultimate goal of policymakers is to pressure
doctors to give up some of their more egregious relationships with industry.”).
41. See Peter Loftus, The New State of Health Care: Doctors Face New
Scrutiny over Gifts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2013, at A1 (“Many doctors say the
increased disclosures are making them rethink their relationships with
industry . . . . Some fear patients will view the payments as tainting their
medical decisions . . . .”); Jonathan D. Rockoff & Hester Plumridge, Drug Firms
Curb Ties to Doctors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2013, at B3; see also Ed Silverman, A
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These laws and guidelines do not obligate recipients of
industry gifts and payments to disclose their arguable
conflicts of interest to patients,42 and it seems that
relatively few patients take the initiative to search the
federal database.43 In contrast, physicians must reveal to
patients self-referrals,44 and, in the pharmaceutical context,
they should secure prior consent for preceptorships.45 At the
Hefty Payday for Hospitals; Drug, Device Makers Paid Billions in 2015 to Care
Providers, BOS. GLOBE, July 1, 2016, at C1 (“[C]ompanies increased charitable
contributions on behalf of physicians by more than 120 percent. Payments for
food and beverage, travel and lodging, and consulting fees were either flat or
declined very slightly. Payments for honoraria fell by about 50 percent and by
more than 30 percent for gifts . . . .”); cf. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn:
Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” About Consumer
Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 398 (1994) (“[W]arning requirements
occasionally represent a surreptitious form of regulation, for instance, to
encourage design modifications or product reformulations without directly
mandating the desired changes.”). But see Tong Guo et al., The Effect of
Information Disclosure on Industry Payments to Physicians (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064769 (finding that the
federal disclosure law has had only a limited impact on payments); Genevieve
Pham-Kanter et al., Letter, Effect of Physician Payment Disclosure Laws on
Prescribing, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 819, 820 (2012) (same for state
disclosure laws).
42. See Abigail Zuger, How Tightly Do Ties Between Doctor and Drug
Company Bind?, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at F5 (“[C]alls for transparency
have yet to penetrate to the individual doctor’s office, still a black box where
conflicts of interest go virtually unchallenged.”); cf. Lars Noah, When
Constitutional Tailoring Demands the Impossible: Unrealistic Scrutiny of
Agencies?, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1462, 1468 n.21 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court
invalidated a state law requiring that charitable solicitors disclose what
percentage of donations actually reach the charity because the state instead
could have published the financial disclosure forms that it already collected. . . .
Such alternative options hardly seem, however, to work nearly as well.”).
43. See Lisa Schencker & Jennifer Smith Richards, Ill. Physicians Got $74M
from Drug Firms in 2016; Database Difference Still Being Debated, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 20, 2017, at C1; see also Abigail Zuger, What Do Patients Think About
Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest? Watching Transparency Evolve, 317 JAMA
1747, 1748 (2017) (doubting that much would change even if they did).
44. See Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest,
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 575 (1993) (“A physician is required, for example, to
tell patients about his or her financial interest in the laboratory to which they
are being referred and to let them decide whether to go to a different
laboratory.”).
45. See Zaneski, supra note 18, at 1A (“AMA guidelines and federal privacy
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other extreme, far more serious conflicts of interest largely
remain hidden from view.46 Somewhat remarkably, even
though extensive federal rules govern informed consent in
the research setting,47 nothing demands that investigators
alert subjects to potential conflicts in that context.48 Then
again, some commentators have speculated that disclosure
grants a clear conscience to recipients of industry payments
who might otherwise harbor ethical qualms about the
rules require that doctors allow the practice, known as ‘shadowing,’ only if
patients give their ‘informed consent.’”); see also supra notes 23–24.
46. See Ian Larkin & George Loewenstein, Business Model-Related Conflict
of Interests in Medicine: Problems and Potential Solutions, 317 JAMA 1745,
1745–46 (2017); Jean M. Mitchell & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Consequences of
Physicians’ Ownership of Health Care Facilities—Joint Ventures in Radiation
Therapy, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1497, 1500 (1992); William W. Stead, Editorial,
The Complex and Multifaceted Aspects of Conflicts of Interest, 317 JAMA 1765
(2017) (summarizing contributions to a theme issue devoted to this broader
subject). See generally INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds.,
2009); Symposium, Conflicts of Interest in the Practice of Medicine, 40 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 431 (2012).
47. See Noah, supra note 13, at 382–86; see also Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017) (codified in
scattered titles of the C.F.R.) (overhauling the rules implemented by multiple
agencies).
48. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Gregory A. Guagnano, Investigator Financial
Disclosures and Its Effect on Research Subjects, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 727, 729
(2007) (“FDA’s disclosure regulations, however, do not require that subjects in a
clinical study be told about the potential conflicts of interest.”); Deborah L.
Shelton & Jason Grotto, Patients at Heart of Device Debate; Many Unaware of
Potential Doctor Conflicts of Interest, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 2011, at A1 (reporting
that hundreds of patients undergoing heart valve repair unknowingly received
investigational annuloplasty rings invented by their cardiac surgeon); see also
Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects:
Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393, 26,397 (May 12,
2004) (suggesting disclosure); Lindsay A. Hampson et al., Patients’ Views on
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Cancer Research Trials, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2330, 2336 (2006) (finding limited interest among subjects); id. at 2331
(explaining that the AMA and others recommend full disclosure of potential
financial conflicts by investigators); Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Views of Potential
Research Participants on Financial Conflicts of Interest: Barriers and
Opportunities for Effective Disclosure, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 901, 904 (2006)
(“[W]e found that many participants want to know about financial interests in
research, whether or not they report that such knowledge would affect their
decision to participate.”).
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practice,49 and centralized reporting—as opposed to
informing patients directly—may only magnify this
problem.
C. Documenting the Impact of Gifts to Prescribers
If health care professionals simply pocketed such
payments without altering their prescribing choices, then
gift giving by the pharmaceutical industry would provide no
cause for alarm. Although companies might wonder why
they persist in wasting this money, and patients ultimately
get to pick up the tab, therapeutic decision making by these
physicians would remain entirely uncorrupted. In reality,
however, gifts to prescribers unmistakably influence
treatment choices,50 and even fairly trivial gifts can have an

49. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7, 22 (2005); id. at 3
(“Physicians will prefer disclosing gifts from pharmaceutical companies (or
disclosing payments for referring patients to clinical trials) to actually
eschewing such benefits.”); George Loewenstein et al., The Unintended
Consequences of Conflict of Interest Disclosure, 307 JAMA 669, 670 (2012)
(“[P]erhaps the most significant likely pitfall of disclosure is . . . a kind of moral
licensing on the part of the profession as a whole—the rationalization that, with
disclosure, the profession has dispensed with its obligation to deal with conflicts
of interest.”); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . . . Nothing, N.Y. TIMES,
at Jan. 22, 2012, at SR1 (“[D]isclosure has taken on the gestalt of confession:
Dump the information and be absolved of further moral or legal
responsibility.”).
50. See Noah, supra note 10, at 432 (“Although most doctors express
probably unjustified confidence that such sales pitches and freebies do not
influence their own prescribing behavior, they do worry about their more
gullible colleagues.”); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2006, at 82
(“The trick is to give doctors gifts without making them feel that they are being
bought. ‘Bribes that aren’t considered bribes,’ [former drug rep turned academic
Michael] Oldani says.”); Shelley Murphy, Gifts to Doctors Is Effective Marketing,
Some Drug Firm Employees Say, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2002, at B1; Zaneski,
supra note 18, at 1A (“Few doctors would admit that drug company sales
pitches influence their prescribing. But pharmaceutical companies behave as
though the reps and their handouts matter very much indeed.”); Abigail Zuger,
When Your Doctor Goes to the Beach, You May Get Burned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2004, at F5 (noting that this “is one of the few research topics in medicine that
will not attract drug company financing”).
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impact.51 After revisions to the industry code sought to end
the practice of distributing trinkets emblazoned with drug
brand names and company logos,52 free food has become the
most common coin of this realm.53
Numerous studies have found a link between industry
payments and prescribing behavior.54 Although previously
51. See Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on
Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 254 (2003); id. at 252
(“[S]mall gifts may be surprisingly influential.”); David Grande et al., Effect of
Exposure to Small Pharmaceutical Promotional Items on Treatment Preferences,
169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 887, 892 (2009); Dana Katz et al., All Gifts Large
and Small: Toward an Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry
Gift-Giving, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2003, at 39, 41 (“When a gift or gesture
of any size is bestowed, it imposes on the recipient a sense of indebtedness. The
obligation to directly reciprocate, whether or not the recipient is conscious of it,
tends to influence behavior.”); Bernard Lo & Deborah Grady, Payments to
Physicians: Does the Amount of Money Make a Difference?, 317 JAMA 1719,
1720 (2017).
52. See Natasha Singer, No Lipitor Mug? Drug Makers Cut out Goodies for
Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at A1 (“The sudden scarcity of free goodies,
though, could enhance the cachet of collections that some doctors have
assembled over the years . . . .”); see also Michael J. Oldani, Thick Prescriptions:
Toward an Interpretation of Pharmaceutical Sales Practices, 18 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 325, 336 (2004) (recalling from his time as a drug rep that
doctors sometimes would specifically request distinctive pens and mugs); Chris
Adams, Student Doctors Protest Largess of Drug Makers, WALL ST. J., June 24,
2002, at B1 (discussing the “Viagra calculator that stood up on a base when the
‘on’ button was pressed”).
53. See Robert Steinbrook, Physicians, Industry Payments for Food and
Beverages, and Drug Prescribing, 317 JAMA 1753, 1753 (2017) (“Although the
median value of each food and beverage payment is modest, these are by far the
most frequent types of gifts and payments that physicians receive from
industry, apparently now supplanting the branded black bags, pens, mugs, and
other tchotchkes of yore.”); see also L. Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown, The High
Cost of Free Lunch, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 169, 171 (2007) (singling
out the persuasive power of food); Ravi Parikh, If Your Doctor Accepts a Free
Meal, Are You Paying for It?, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2016, at E6; Stephanie
Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at
A1.
54. See, e.g., Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry:
Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 375–79 (2000) (reviewing the
literature available at the time); see also Anusua Datta & Dhaval Dave, Effects
of Physician-Directed Pharmaceutical Promotion on Prescription Behaviors:
Longitudinal Evidence, 26 HEALTH ECON. 450, 452–53, 465–66 (2017)
(referencing and building upon the research published in the economics and
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researchers had to conduct surveys of physicians,55 the
federal payments database now offers a goldmine for
anyone interested in this question.56 Several recently
published studies have documented an association between
drug industry payments and prescribing behavior,57
including the remarkable discovery that even inexpensive
meals might do the trick.58 Investigative journalists also
marketing literature on all types of advertising directed to doctors); infra notes
57–59 (citing some of the latest studies).
55. See, e.g., Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of PhysicianIndustry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742, 1746 (2007) (“Overall, 94%
of the [survey] respondents reported some kind of relationship with industry
during the previous year.”); Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Professionalism
and Changes in Physician-Industry Relationships from 2004 to 2009, 170
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1820, 1823–25 (2010) (finding a drop of ten percentage
points in a follow up survey). More recently, researchers have tapped into
individual state or company-specific payment databases. See, e.g., Aaron S.
Kesselheim et al., Distributions of Industry Payments to Massachusetts
Physicians, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2051 (2013); James S. Yeh et al.,
Association of Industry Payments to Physicians with the Prescribing of BrandName Statins in Massachusetts, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 763, 765–67 (2016);
see also Alison R. Hwong et al., A Systematic Review of State and Manufacturer
Physician Payment Disclosure Websites: Implications for Implementation of the
Sunshine Act, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 208 (2014) (comparing these databases).
56. See, e.g., Scott E. Hadland et al., Industry Payments to Physicians for
Opioid Products, 2013–2015, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1493, 1493 (2017) (“For
the first time, exhaustive data on payments are now available through the
Open Payments program . . . .”); id. at 1494 (finding that one out of twelve
physicians received payments from sellers of opioids during the study period,
totaling over $46 million); Kathryn R. Tringale et al., Types and Distribution of
Payments from Industry to Physicians in 2015, 317 JAMA 1774, 1780 (2017)
(“The current population-based analysis of industry-to-physician payments in
2015 shows the far-reaching extent (more than 10 million transactions totaling
$2.4 billion) of these reported financial relationships.”).
57. See, e.g., William Fleischman et al., Association Between Payments from
Manufacturers of Pharmaceuticals to Physicians and Regional Prescribing:
Cross Sectional Ecological Study, 354 BMJ i4189, at 6–7 (2016); Aaron P.
Mitchell et al., Letter, Pharmaceutical Industry Payments and Oncologists’
Selection of Targeted Cancer Therapies in Medicare Beneficiaries, 178 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 854 (2018); Roy H. Perlis & Clifford S. Perlis, Physician
Payments from Industry Are Associated with Greater Medicare Part D
Prescribing Costs, 11 PLOS ONE e0155474, at 10 (2016); Susan F. Wood et al.,
Influence of Pharmaceutical Marketing on Medicare Prescriptions in the District
of Columbia, 12 PLOS ONE e0186060, at 9–11 (2017).
58. See Colette DeJong et al., Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Meals
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have uncovered similar linkages in the federal database. 59
D. The Seedy Aspects of “Seeding Trials”
Seeding trials have drawn particular criticism. Once
largely just a matter of speculation, researchers have
documented their growing use.60 In 1994, FDA officials
summarized the attributes of these “studies” as follows:
Features that distinguish such trials from scientifically rigorous
studies include the use of a design that does not support the stated
research goals, the recruitment of investigators not because they
are experts or leading researchers but because they are frequent

and Physician Prescribing Patterns for Medicare Beneficiaries, 176 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1114, 1120 (2016) (finding “that receipt of a single industrysponsored meal, with a mean value of less than $20, was associated with
prescription of the promoted brand-name drug at significantly higher rates,”
and that “the relationship was dose dependent, with additional meals and
costlier meals associated with greater increases in prescribing of the promoted
drug”); id. at 1121 (noting caveats); see also Peter Loftus, Study Says Gifts
Affect Physicians’ Drug Choices, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2016, at A1 (reporting on
this study).
59. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, Public Disclosure of Payments to Physicians
from Industry, 317 JAMA 1749, 1749–50 (2017) (discussing the work of
ProPublica); Aaron Kessler et al., The More Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More
Money They Make, CNN (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/11/
health/prescription-opioid-payments-eprise/index.html;
see
also
Dennis
Thompson, Drug Firms’ Gifts Linked to Docs’ Choices, BALT. SUN, June 22,
2017, at C1 (reporting that payments of a few hundred dollars influenced
selections among equally effective cancer treatments even though patients
might face more bothersome side effects as a result of the choice).
60. See David Malakoff, Allegations of Waste: The “Seeding” Study, 322
SCIENCE 213, 213 (2008) (“Although seeding trials may be a longtime open
secret in the industry, the authors [of a new article in the Annals of Internal
Medicine] write that the Merck documents [involving Vioxx®] ‘provide the first
strong documentary evidence’ of the practice.”); Bob Fernandez, Journal Takes
on Drugmaker “Seeding Trials,” PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2008, at C1 (“Seeding
trials had been an ‘open secret’ in the drug industry, but there had been no hard
proof to show they existed.”); see also id. (Dr. Harold Sox “said seeding trials
betrayed the trust patients had in doctors and drug companies. Patients say
they believe they are participating in a bona fide drug trial to determine health
benefits of a drug. But drug companies have other goals: selling
pharmaceuticals.”). At least temporarily, seeding trials may manage to dodge
federal reporting requirements: CMS allows delayed disclosure (for up to four
years) of payments related to non-clinical trials designed to investigate
potential new uses of approved products. See 42 C.F.R. § 403.910 (2017).
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prescribers of competing products in the same therapeutic class,
disproportionately high payments given to “investigators” for their
work (although the only work may be to write prescriptions for the
drug), sponsorship of the studies by the company’s sales and
marketing division rather than its research department, minimal
requirements for data, and the collection of data that are of little
or no value to the company.61

Their article offered a pair of examples that the agency had
encountered, including one seeding trial for a new
antihypertensive agent that tasked the manufacturer’s
sales force with recruiting 2,500 frequent prescribers of
such drugs who would agree to enroll a dozen patients each,
which earned participating physicians $85 per patient (up
to $1,050 total). 62 The FDA could do little, however, other
than deliver a slap on the wrist, “inform[ing] the sponsor
that no data from this trial could be used to promote the
product,”63 even though the authors had recognized that the
trial itself rather than any collected results represented the
central aspect of this promotional campaign.64
Over the last decade, more such illustrations have
61. David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars—Drug Promotion in a
Competitive Marketplace, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1351 (1994).
62. See id.; see also id. (quoting an internal company memo about another
antihypertensive seeding trial that also sought 2,500 physicians though to
enroll only ten patients each).
63. Id. In contrast, the agency managed to prevent a planned seeding trial of
an anticonvulsant—which intended to recruit 500 prescribers to enroll five
patients each (and earn $100 per patient)—because it had represented “a thinly
disguised” effort to promote the drug for an unapproved use (i.e., panic disorder)
and, for that reason, would have violated federal law. See id.
64. See id. (calling these studies “thinly veiled attempts to entice doctors to
prescribe a new drug,” aimed at “undoing physicians’ comfortable habits of
prescribing a competing, more established product”); see also Bruce M. Psaty &
Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Clinical Trial Investigators and Their Prescribing
Patterns: Another Dimension to the Relationship Between Physician
Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 295 JAMA 2787, 2788 (2006)
(discussing a slightly more rigorous trial of an approved asthma drug that
remained unpublished but “had the desired outcome of seeding studies and
improved market share among trial-conducting practices”); id. at 2787 (“The
umbrella of a research study allows the sponsor to pay the physician
investigators in a way that circumvents rules against direct inducements to
prescribe.”).
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emerged after again escaping regulatory oversight. 65 First,
documents uncovered in litigation against Pfizer revealed
that a predecessor company had conducted a seeding trial
for the anticonvulsant Neurontin® (gabapentin), recruiting
more than 700 physicians to enroll an average of three
patients each (and receive $300 per patient) in order to try
higher-than-approved doses of the drug in treating
epilepsy.66 A couple of years later, researchers discussed a
similar campaign that Merck undertook to encourage the
use of Vioxx® (rofecoxib),67 which the company later
withdrew from the market after discovering that this
prescription analgesic posed heightened cardiovascular
risks.68 Apart from objections to promotion masquerading

65. See Carl Elliott, Op-Ed., Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2011, at A27 (complaining that, “even after particularly egregious seeding
trials have been exposed, the F.D.A. has not issued sanctions,” adding that
subjects may suffer serious injuries but institutional review boards “don’t
typically pass judgment on whether a study is being carried out merely to
market a drug”).
66. See Michael Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of
Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 284, 289–90 (2006) (discussing this seeding trial as just one among many
of the seller’s questionable marketing tactics); see also Samuel D. Krumholz et
al., Study of Neurontin: Titrate to Effect, Profile of Safety (STEPS) Trial: A
Narrative Account of a Gabapentin Seeding Trial, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1100, 1104–05 (2011) (offering more details about this seeding trial); id. at 1103
(“[C]ompany sales representatives rewarded some investigators for achieving
specific recruitment milestones; physicians were given a free lunch after
recruiting 3 patients and a free dinner after 7 patients.”); id. at 1105 (arguing
provocatively that the participating physicians represented the true and
unwitting subjects of this company-sponsored research).
67. See Kevin P. Hill et al., The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of
Internal Documents, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 252, 256 (2008)
(explaining that the company recruited 600 physicians to serve as investigators,
enrolling over 5,500 of their patients, half of whom received Vioxx); see also
Philip Greenland & Donald Lloyd-Jones, Critical Lessons from the ENHANCE
Trial, 299 JAMA 953, 954 (2008) (speculating that a study of Vytorin®
(ezetimibe with simvastatin), another Merck drug, was nothing more than a
seeding trial).
68. See Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path
to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1, at 1.
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as scientific investigation,69 seeding trials unmistakably
influence the prescribing choices made by participating
physicians.70
II. REFASHIONING TORT DOCTRINE TO COMBAT
INAPPROPRIATE DRUG MARKETING TACTICS
What, if anything, might guard against the problems
associated with pharmaceutical industry payments to
prescribers? Some commentators have called on health care
professionals to stop accepting such gifts altogether.71
Given the apparent failure of self-regulation, however,

69. See C. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman, The Neurontin Legacy—
Marketing Through Misinformation and Manipulation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED.
103, 105 (2009); Joseph S. Ross et al., Promoting Transparency in
Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Research, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 72, 72–
73 (2012); Harold C. Sox & Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Seeding Trials: Just
Say “No,” 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 279, 279 (2008) (“Why would a drug
company go to the expense and bother of conducting a trial involving hundreds
of practitioners—each recruiting a few patients—when a study based at a few
large medical centers could accomplish the same scientific purposes much more
efficiently?”).
70. See Morten Andersen et al., How Conducting a Clinical Trial Affects
Physicians’ Guideline Adherence and Drug Preferences, 295 JAMA 2759, 2764
(2006) (concluding that “physician involvement in clinical trials is a powerful
tool for influencing company-specific drug preferences”).
71. See Blumenthal, supra note 21, at 1889 (“The only practical approach to
dealing with interactions between drug companies and physicians, in the view
of many critics, is for physicians not to accept anything of financial value, no
matter how trivial, from drug companies.”); Howard Brody, The Company We
Keep: Why Physicians Should Refuse to See Pharmaceutical Representatives, 3
ANNALS FAM. MED. 82, 84–85 (2005); Philip Greenland, Editorial, Time for the
Medical Profession to Act: New Policies Needed Now on Interactions Between
Pharmaceutical Companies and Physicians, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 829,
830 (2009); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing
Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 491, 518, 528–29, 536–37 (2009); Katz et al., supra note 51, at 43–
44; Lewis H. Margolis, The Ethics of Accepting Gifts from Pharmaceutical
Companies, 88 PEDIATRICS 1233, 1235–37 (1991); Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for
the Pizza? Redefining the Relationships Between Doctors and Drug Companies.
2. Disentanglement, 326 BMJ 1193, 1193 (2003); Mary Engel, A Pox on Drug
Maker Freebies, Say Some Doctors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at A1. See
generally Symposium, Dangerous Liaisons? Industry Relations with Health
Professionals, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398 (2009).
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other commentators have called for greater legislative and
regulatory intervention.72 This Part suggests, instead, that
the judiciary might have a productive role to play.
Relatively minor adjustments to medical malpractice and
products liability rules could make physician payments less
attractive to both recipients and companies.
A. Informed Consent Duties of Health Care Professionals
Physicians may face civil liability if they fail to secure
the informed consent of their patients. 73 In a few
jurisdictions that continue to focus on the origins of the
doctrine in the tort of battery, consent obligations attach
only in cases of surgical and other invasive procedures,
thereby excluding therapeutic interventions such as
pharmaceutical products recommended by a physician.74
For the most part, however, physicians also must secure
informed consent when they recommend noninvasive
treatments,75 particularly when they prescribe or
72. See Rikin S. Mehta, Why Self-Regulation Does Not Work: Resolving
Prescription Corruption Caused by Excessive Gift-Giving by Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 799, 820–21 (2008); id. at 808–10
(critiquing the internal compliance programs adopted by two large
pharmaceutical manufacturers); Joshua Weiss, Note, Medical Marketing in the
United States: A Prescription for Reform, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260, 273–76,
292 (2010); see also Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug
Representatives: Exploring the Dynamics of the Relationship, 22 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 184, 185 (2007) (“[P]hysicians have so many ways of justifying
their relationships with detailers that conflict-of-interest policies based on selfregulation are unlikely to succeed.”); id. at 189 (“Given physicians’ attitudes,
even these minimal [voluntary] standards are not likely to succeed . . . .”).
73. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724–25 (1997) (referencing
this longstanding common-law rule). For a more detailed treatment of this tort
obligation, see Noah, supra note 13, at 364–79.
74. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 619–20 (Pa. 1997); see also
Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 732–33 (Tenn. 1998) (treating the failure to
secure informed consent as a claim for battery); cf. Shuler v. Garrett, 743 F.3d
170, 173–75 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the administration of heparin against
the patient’s wishes and in spite of her known allergy to the drug qualified as a
medical battery under Tennessee law).
75. See Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 460–61 (N.J. 1999)
(holding that a physician who prescribed bed rest as treatment for a fractured
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administer pharmaceutical products.76 Financial conflicts of
interest generally have not, however, required disclosure.
1. Types of Information That Doctors Must Disclose
Before subjecting a patient to a diagnostic or
therapeutic intervention, health professionals must
describe its general nature.77 More importantly, they need
to reveal any significant risks known to accompany the
medical procedure.78 In addition, physicians must disclose
reasonable alternative courses of action to the patient. 79
Some courts would include among such alternatives the
likelihood of a better outcome if treated by a more skillful
physician (in effect, a duty of referral),80 but other
hip had a duty to advise his elderly patient of surgical alternatives); Allen v.
Harrison, 374 P.3d 812, 817–18 (Okla. 2016).
76. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. United States, 915 F.2d 560, 562–63 (9th Cir.
1990); Summit Bank v. Panos, 570 N.E.2d 960, 967–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); see
also Schilling v. Ellis Hosp., 906 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188–89 (App. Div. 2010) (holding
that a psychiatrist may have breached a duty to warn the patient of a rare risk
of developing gynecomastia from use of the antipsychotic Risperdal ®
(risperidone)).
77. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977); Kohoutek v.
Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 298–300 (Minn. 1986); Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 713
A.2d 1019, 1027–28 (N.J. 1998).
78. See, e.g., Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 206–08 (Ky. 2015); Rizzo v.
Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994); see also Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., 687
N.E.2d 1300, 1302–04 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that a pediatrician owed the parents
a duty to warn of the risk of contracting polio from their vaccinated infant); cf.
Dewey K. Ziegler et al., How Much Information About Adverse Effects of
Medication Do Patients Want from Physicians?, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
706, 711–12 (2001) (finding that patients report wanting unrealistic amounts of
information about drug risks).
79. See, e.g., Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1991); Herrington v.
Spell, 692 So. 2d 93, 100 (Miss. 1997); Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients &
Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 666 (Wis. 2012). The duty to disclose
alternatives does not, however, include telling patients about the availability of
experimental treatments. See, e.g., Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 (11th
Cir. 1993); Schiff v. Prados, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 182–84 (Ct. App. 2001).
80. See, e.g., Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Del. 1997); Goldberg
v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 717 (Md. 2006); Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545
N.W.2d 495, 504–10 (Wis. 1996); see also Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville
Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 687–88 (Ky. 2003) (“If the patient’s
ailment is beyond the physician’s knowledge, ability or capacity to treat with
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characteristics related to the provider rather than the
underlying course of treatment generally would not
necessitate disclosure.81
The duty to secure informed consent only requires that
physicians communicate “material” information to their
patients.82 Traditionally, courts asked what a reasonable
physician would have disclosed under the circumstances,83
but many states have replaced this professional standard
with a patient-based test of informed consent,84 asking
whether a reasonable person would have regarded the
information as important.85 Whatever the standard used for
reasonable success, the physician has a duty to disclose the situation to the
patient and to advise the patient to consult a specialist.”).
81. See, e.g., Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 20–22 (Conn. 2006) (poor prior
outcomes); Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780–82
(Ga. 2000) (substance abuse); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958–59 (Haw.
1997) (lack of special credentials); Jarrell v. Kaul, 123 A.3d 1022, 1034–35 (N.J.
2015) (lack of mandated liability insurance coverage); Duttry v. Patterson, 771
A.2d 1255, 1258–59 (Pa. 2001) (surgeon’s relative inexperience); see also
Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“[E]ven
medical school grades[] could be considered material facts . . . . [W]e conclude
that a surgeon’s lack of experience in performing a particular surgical procedure
is not a material fact for purposes of finding liability predicated on failure to
secure an informed consent.”).
82. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 299–302 (1st Cir.
2002); Dunn v. Yager, 58 So. 3d 1171, 1200–02 (Miss. 2011).
83. See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1254–56 & n.7 (10th Cir.
2010); Paul v. Lee, 568 N.W.2d 510, 514–16 (Mich. 1997); Robinson v. Bleicher,
559 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Neb. 1997).
84. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[I]t
is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the
direction in which his interests seem to lie.”); Shannon v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156,
1170 (Md. 2014); see also David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in
Informed Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risk, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 105, 119–21 (2007) (evaluating the split of
authority on this question).
85. See Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) (“Material
information is that which the physician knows or should know would be
regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when
deciding to accept or reject the recommended medical procedure.”); Carr v.
Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 494–99 (Haw. 1995); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med.
Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 361–62 (Iowa 1987). A few other courts opt for a more
subjective test, which inquires about the perhaps idiosyncratic prior knowledge
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judging materiality, plaintiffs also must prove causation,
which typically means asking whether a reasonable patient
would have declined a treatment had the physician
disclosed the additional information.86
2. Obligating Physicians to Reveal Conflicts of Interest
Perhaps the informed consent doctrine should include a
duty to reveal potential conflicts of interest. Although
arguably immaterial as a provider characteristic,87 financial
conflicts that bear directly on the choice of treatment
certainly should qualify as relevant information. 88 Many
physicians seem to have an ethical blind spot on this score:
and preferences of the particular patient. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707
F.2d 1544, 1548–49 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1150–51
(Alaska 1993); Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602, 605–06 (La. Ct. App.
1996); Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d 204, 209–11 (Or. 2000).
86. See, e.g., Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 671–76 (Haw. 1995); Ashe v.
Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122–24 (Tenn. 1999); Backlund v.
Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950, 957–59 (Wash. 1999); see also Martin v. Lahti,
809 S.E.2d 644, 650 (Va. 2018) (upholding the dismissal of a deceased patient’s
informed consent claim for lack of proof on causation after concluding that her
daughters’ “testimony is nothing but speculation about what Starr’s thought
process might have been if various items of information had been provided to
her with respect to this specific surgery”).
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In fact, a handful of courts
have declined to require disclosures of potential conflicts of interest. See, e.g.,
Dimmick v. United States, No. C 05-0971 PJH, 2006 WL 3741911, at *19–20
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) (rejecting the claim that a physician should have
disclosed his work as a consultant for the manufacturer of the HIV drug
Kaletra® (ritonavir)); Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 874 F. Supp. 657, 659 (E.D.
Pa. 1995) (surgeon with financial ties to manufacturer of bone screws).
88. See Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose
Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 1019–24
(2007); Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the
Boundaries of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 841–43. Half a century ago,
in the course of rejecting challenges to a state law that barred physician
ownership of pharmacies, a California court explained that “the doctor who has
a financial interest in where his prescriptions are filled may be tempted to
prescribe unnecessary medicine, or to prescribe a drug which yields a greater
margin of profit or to keep a patient on drugs for an unnecessary period of
time.” Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256,
262 (Ct. App. 1967) (adding that “a sick patient deserves to be free of any
reasonable suspicion that his doctor’s judgment is influenced by a profit
motive”).
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insofar as they refuse to recognize the possibility that gifts
and payments might influence their treatment decisions,89
these doctors see no need for disclosure. Several studies
have, however, demonstrated that goodies and money affect
prescribing choices,90 and patients evidently want to know
about it.91 In a similar vein, when health care professionals
make use of experimental treatments or otherwise engage
in research using their patients, concerns about the
potential for conflicts of interest help to explain demands
for fuller disclosure about this aspect of the encounter. 92
89. See Allan S. Brett et al., Are Gifts from Pharmaceutical Companies
Ethically Problematic? A Survey of Physicians, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2213, 2216–18 (2003); Howard Brody, A Matter of Influence, 21 HEALTH AFF.
232, 232 (2002) (bemoaning “how blind we are to the fact that we are being
influenced”); Campbell, supra note 29, at 1796 (“[P]hysicians vehemently deny
that their industry relationships have any of these negative effects—but they
are less convinced that the same is true of their physician colleagues.”); Michael
A. Steinman et al., Of Principles and Pens: Attitudes and Practices of Medicine
Housestaff Toward Pharmaceutical Industry Promotions, 110 AM. J. MED. 551,
555–56 (2001); see also Michael Booth & Jennifer Brown, Doctors Still Received
Big Fees from Drug Companies to Speak, DENV. POST, Mar. 26, 2013, at 1A
(“Some of the doctors said they disclose these payments to patients, but many
doctors declined to answer questions about their fees.”).
90. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
91. See Michael A. Steinman, Gifts to Physicians in the Consumer Marketing
Era, 284 JAMA 2243, 2243 (2000) (“Surveys show that as many as 70% of
patients believe these gifts significantly impact prescribing, and . . . 24% of
patients reported that their perception of the medical profession changed after
learning about drug company gifts to physicians.”); see also Robert V. Gibbons
et al., A Comparison of Physicians’ and Patients’ Attitudes Toward
Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 151, 153 (1998)
(“Patients are more likely than their physicians to believe that acceptance of
pharmaceutical gifts may influence prescribing behavior.”); David Grande et al.,
Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts to Physicians: Patient Beliefs and Trust in
Physicians and the Health Care System, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 274, 277
(2012) (“[P]atients that believe physicians accept pharmaceutical industry gifts
are significantly more likely to report . . . distrust.”); Marian Wolston, An MS
Patient Loses Trust When She Finds out Her Doctor Is Paid by Drug Companies,
30 HEALTH AFF. 2449, 2451 (2011) (“I find it inexcusable that doctors aren’t
routinely required to disclose their conflicts of interest to their patients.”).
92. See, e.g., Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 255 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(“The psychology of the doctor-patient relation, and the rewards, financial and
professional, attendant upon recognition of experimental success, increase the
potential for abuse and strengthen the rationale for uniform disclosure.”); see
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Even if seeding trials do not represent genuine research,
they undoubtedly create financial pressures that may
influence treatment choices.93
In the move from its origins in the law of battery, the
duty of doctors to secure informed consent extends well
beyond the standards of professional negligence and
resembles an obligation owed by fiduciaries.94 Indeed,
several commentators have defined the physician-patient
relationship in precisely such terms.95 Although this
therapeutic relationship does not countenance broader
expectations of safeguarding the nonmedical interests of
patients,96 physicians as fiduciaries should scrupulously
also Noah, supra note 13, at 371 (“[S]everal arguments support the imposition
of more rigorous informed consent requirements in the research context . . .
[including] heightened concerns about conflicts of interest, which means that
the researcher may have goals other than doing what is best for the subject.”);
id. at 379 (speculating that a requirement to disclose experimental status
“alerts patients to the need for exercising greater vigilance about the potential
for conflicts of interest”); id. at 393 (“[P]hysicians may face some of the same
conflicts of interest that researchers encounter.”).
93. See supra notes 22, 60–70 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483, 486 (Cal. 1990)
(distinguishing the fiduciary obligations of the plaintiff’s physicians from the
more limited duties of several other named defendants); Gomez v. Sauerwein,
289 P.3d 755, 759 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 331 P.3d 19 (Wash. 2014); see
also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916
(1994) (“Physicians may not deal with their patients at arm’s length; they owe
their patients a fiduciary duty, which includes an obligation to act exclusively in
the patient’s interests and to disclose all information material to those
interests.”); id. at 921 (“[T]he physician must go so far as to prefer the patient’s
interests to her own, acting as the patient’s selfless, scrupulous, dutiful agent.”);
id. at 927–28 (discussing the conflicts of interest rationale for demanding
informed consent).
95. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A
Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1186–210 (2009); Dayna Bowen Matthew,
Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59
BUFF. L. REV. 715, 721–22, 726–59, 795–98 (2011); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why
Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 45–57
(2015).
96. See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608–09 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the
duty to disclose did not extend to information material to a patient’s financial or
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avoid—or at least reveal the existence of—financial
interests
that
might
taint
their
treatment
97
recommendations. In a handful of cases, courts have
construed the duty to secure patient consent as
encompassing such disclosures.98 If recognized more
broadly, then patients might enjoy greater protection from
questionable prescribing choices.
Even if courts embraced the idea that industry
payments provided a basis for asserting informed consent

other nonmedical interests); Moore, 793 P.2d at 485 n.10 (“In some respects the
term ‘fiduciary’ is too broad. . . . A physician is not the patient’s financial
adviser.”); see also E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary:
Discarding a Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586, 588 (2005) (noting
that “it is debatable whether physicians are fiduciaries in the strictest sense”);
id. at 588–90 (elaborating); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis
as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 301–03 (1999); id. at 307
(“[P]hysicians should not feel pressured into becoming zealous advocates for
their patients outside of the therapeutic relationship.”).
97. See Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 71, at 519–32 (advocating the
recognition of claims for a breach of fiduciary duty whenever physicians accept
industry payments that might taint their therapeutic recommendations).
98. See, e.g., Shapira v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 99 A.3d 217,
220–22 (Del. 2014) (rejecting an objection to the relevancy of evidence that a
catheter manufacturer had paid the defendant physician to join its speaker’s
bureau because the jury could treat this potential conflict of interest as material
in resolving the patient’s informed consent claim); id. at 222 (“The conflict
created a risk that [Dr.] Shapira wanted to perform the procedure because it
would benefit him personally, and not because it was the most appropriate
procedure. Likewise, the conflict created a risk that Shapira did not disclose or
consider all reasonable alternatives.”); id. (“This is not a case where a doctor
fails to disclose that she owns some stock in a publicly-traded medical company.
Shapira was making a name for himself, and earning money, by promoting the
On-Q procedure. In addition, he was gathering data about the procedure’s
efficacy.”); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(recognizing that a prescriber who received kickbacks from the distributor of
Protropin® (human growth hormone) could face liability for malpractice (failure
to secure informed consent) but not for breach of fiduciary duty, and dismissing
the claim on other grounds); see also Moore, 793 P.2d at 483–86 (holding that a
leukemia patient could assert informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty
claims against his physician for failing to disclose a research interest in cells
removed during and after a splenectomy); id. at 484 (“The possibility that an
interest extraneous to the patient’s health has affected the physician’s
judgment is something that a reasonable patient would want to know in
deciding whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment.”).
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claims, it would probably do little to guard against
physician conflicts of interest. Financial conflicts have
become endemic in medical research,99 but disclosure
requirements have not worked terribly well.100 Unless
health care professionals find themselves embarrassed to
confess about the industry gifts that they receive and
respond to a disclosure obligation by avoiding the conflict in
the first place, simply sharing this information with
patients will not accomplish much. Upon hearing such
disclosures, some patients might become wary about their
physician’s
treatment
recommendation
(perhaps
unnecessarily so) or at least first decide to get a second
opinion,101 but in most cases the revelation of a potential
conflict of interest will likely go the way of so much other
information made an aspect of consent obligations—
namely, in one ear and out the other.102
99. See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 463–64
(2003); Noah, supra note 10, at 406–12, 415, 422–24, 434; see also id. at 395
(“[P]hysicians must remain vigilant about the conflicts of interest that now
permeate the biomedical literature.”); William M. Sage, Some Principles
Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive
Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007).
100. See Noah, supra note 10, at 409 (“Even if authors conscientiously
adhered to the disclosure requirements, this mechanism for dealing with
conflicts of interest may have only limited value.”); Shirley S. Wang, Simply
Disclosing Funds Behind Studies May Not Erase Bias, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
2006, at A11; see also Lisa A. Bero, Editorial, Accepting Commercial
Sponsorship: Disclosure Helps—but Is Not a Panacea, 319 BMJ 653, 654 (1999)
(“Disclosure does not necessarily eliminate the influence of industry funding on
research or doctors’ behaviour.”).
101. See Adam Licurse et al., The Impact of Disclosing Financial Ties in
Research and Clinical Care: A Systematic Review, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
675, 680–81 (2010) (concluding that disclosure would have fairly modest effects
on patient decision making); cf. Joshua E. Perry et al., Trust and Transparency:
Patient Perceptions of Physicians’ Financial Relationships with Pharmaceutical
Companies, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 475, 484, 487 (2014) (finding in a survey that
industry payments led respondents to view a hypothetical physician as less
trustworthy, except for consulting fees, which instead resulted in a perception of
greater expertise).
102. See Katrina Armstrong & Andrew A. Freiberg, Challenges and
Opportunities in Disclosing Financial Interests to Patients, 317 JAMA 1743,
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B. Disclosure Duties of Prescription Drug Manufacturers
Whether or not physicians might face liability for
failing to inform their patients of potential conflicts of
interest, the companies that intrude upon that relationship
should shoulder responsibility. Indeed, given the inherent
shortcomings associated with litigating informed consent
claims, courts might do well to focus on the sources rather
than the recipients of gifts. It would not make sense,
however, to obligate manufacturers of prescription products
to disclose physician payments, as these companies rarely
owe any duty to communicate directly with patients.
Instead, courts could expand the limited tort duties of
manufacturers to warn in a way better calibrated to the
consequences of their efforts to inappropriately influence
prescribers: in those cases where they have offered rewards
to a particular physician in exchange for selecting their
therapeutic products, those companies should lose the
benefit of the learned intermediary doctrine, which would
then obligate them to supply adequate warnings of
prescription drug risks directly to the patients of these
conflicted doctors.
1. Obligations to Warn Learned Intermediaries
Traditionally, manufacturers satisfied their duty to
warn of the hazards associated with prescription drugs or
implanted medical devices by communicating risk
information to physicians, under the so-called “learned
intermediary” rule. Insofar as it imposes a duty to warn
health care professionals, the doctrine hardly provokes any
1744 (2017) (“The amount of information could easily become overwhelming,
making it more likely that it will be ignored in decision making.”); see also Omri
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 667–70 (2011); Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging
Challenges of Informed Consent, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 855, 857 (2015)
(Patient’s “decisions are driven more by trust in their doctor or by deference to
authority than by the information provided.”). Actually, consent to medical
treatment has become primarily about signing lengthy forms without managing
to read or understand them.
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controversy.103 The affiliated absence of a duty to warn
patients, however, continues to raise eyebrows.104 Courts
have justified this rule on a number of grounds: physicians
must make the judgment about whether to administer or
prescribe a medication or use a device; manufacturers
should not intrude on the doctor-patient relationship (for
instance, by providing information that contradicts the
physicians’ advice to the patient or unnecessarily alarms
the patient, possibly leading to noncompliance with the
prescribed therapy); physicians can better tailor their
communication of important and complex information in
ways understandable to their typically less-educated
patients; and manufacturers have no practical means of
conveying risk information directly to patients, apart from
drugs that pharmacists dispense in unit-of-use packaging
with enclosed leaflets for patients.105

103. See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74
BROOK. L. REV. 839, 892 (2009) (“[E]ven critics of the rule do not suggest that
pharmaceutical companies should provide warnings only to patients and have
no tort duty to warn physicians.”); id. at 892 n.226 (“Indeed, the first judicial
opinion to use the ‘learned intermediary’ terminology did so in a case where the
prescription drug manufacturer had argued that it owed no duty to warn the
physician.”). Courts also have found duties to warn physicians, nurses, and
other health care professionals who may treat or advise patients in the
aftermath of someone else’s earlier prescribing or treatment decision. See, e.g.,
Bee v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 295–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(dentists); Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28 S.W.3d 87, 92–93 (Tex. App.
2000) (nurses).
104. See Noah, supra note 103, at 894 (“The learned intermediary doctrine
has attracted its share of critics who argue, among other things, that the
defense reflects an anachronistic and excessively paternalistic model of the
physician-patient relationship and fails to take into account changes in the
delivery of health care services.”); see also Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
247 P.3d 244, 259 (Mont. 2010) (“The realities of modern medicine increasingly
conflict with the learned intermediary doctrine’s underlying premises.
Unsurprisingly, the doctrine is in a state of flux as it adapts to new medical
practices.”).
105. Noah, supra note 12, at 170; see also id. at 155–61 (elaborating on these
rationales with copious citations to the case law and commentary available
more than twenty years ago); id. at 180 (“In the past, the learned intermediary
rule protected manufacturers of prescription drugs from tort liability if they
conveyed an adequate warning to physicians. Some commentators have argued
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Mass immunizations represented the classic exception
to the learned intermediary doctrine: when vaccines are
administered in such a program, no health care professional
makes any sort of an individualized medical decision or
engages in a dialogue with their patient.106 A few courts
have extended this exception to other products, such as
prescription contraceptives, for which a physician may play
a reduced role in helping patients to select among available
options.107 The overwhelming majority of courts do not,
however, recognize any exception for contraceptive drugs or
devices.108 Courts occasionally have crafted still other (ad
hoc) exceptions where the rationales underlying the learned
that the rule no longer serves a legitimate purpose and should be eliminated
altogether or at least reduced in scope by recognizing a number of new
exceptions.”); Noah, supra note 103, at 890–97 (revisiting these rationales with
updated citations and further analysis); id. at 912 (noting the application to
certain medical devices). The last (practical) concern has become far less
significant as pharmacists increasingly print out and attach patient information
sheets at the time of dispensing, though these generally do not originate with
drug manufacturers. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Prescription Leaflets Lack Key
Safety Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at D3; see also Richard C. Ausness, The
Disorderly Conduct of Words: Civil Liability for Injuries Caused by the
Dissemination of False or Inaccurate Information, 65 S.C. L. REV. 131, 180–82
(2013) (discussing claims brought against the publishers of “patient drug
education materials” supplied by pharmacists when filling prescriptions).
106. See, e.g., Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987) (“If
the drug is given under clinic-type conditions the manufacturer is obligated to
warn consumers directly.”); Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 647
(4th Cir. 1981) (limiting the mass-immunization exception to massive,
nationwide immunization programs where it would have been foreseeable by
the manufacturer that the “vaccine would be dispensed without a physician’s
consideration of individual needs and circumstances”); Allison v. Merck & Co.,
878 P.2d 948, 958 n.16 (Nev. 1994).
107. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989)
(intrauterine devices (IUDs)); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867,
878–79 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (oral contraceptives); Niedner v. Ortho-McNeil
Pharm., Inc., 58 N.E.3d 1080, 1084–85 (Mass. Ct. App. 2016) (hormonal
contraceptive patch).
108. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700,
704–05 & n.18 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (collecting cases), aff’d, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.
1999); see also Doe v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 272 (D. Me.
2004) (declining to extend the rationales underlying the contraceptive exception
to an antidepressant prescribed for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive
disorder).
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intermediary doctrine no longer apply.109
When it appeared two decades ago, the Products
Liability Restatement grudgingly endorsed the learned
intermediary doctrine in its special rules governing sellers
of prescription drugs and medical devices.110 An
accompanying comment explained that the blackletter
formulation attempted to capture the mass immunization
exception, discussed the debate about possible exceptions
where the FDA has required the use of patient package
inserts (PPIs) or manufacturers have decided to engage in
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), but left to
developing case law the adoption of these or still other
exceptions.111

109. See, e.g., Nichols v. McNeilab, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 562, 564–65 (E.D. Mich.
1993) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine would not defeat a claim
alleging failure to provide notification of a drug recall prompted by safety
concerns, distinguishing this from the risk information conveyed to patients at
the time that a drug is initially prescribed); Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365
P.3d 944, 953 (Ariz. 2016) (holding the rule inapplicable to a misrepresentation
claim). But cf. Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 846–47 (Conn. 2001)
(declining to do so for drug samples).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) (AM. LAW INST.
1998). Learned intermediary concepts undergirded adjacent blackletter
provisions related to design defects and the liability of non-manufacturing
sellers. See id. cmt. d (“When prescribing health-care providers are adequately
informed of the relevant benefits and risks associated with various prescription
drugs and medical devices, they can reach appropriate decisions regarding
which drug or device is best for specific patients.”); id. cmt. f (“Learned
intermediaries must generally be relied upon to see that the right drugs . . .
reach the right patients.”); id. cmt. h (explaining that retailers “should be
permitted to rely on the special expertise of . . . prescribing and treating healthcare providers”). Two years after publication of this volume, however, one
state’s high court rejected the new design defect standard while endorsing the
learned intermediary rule on failure-to-warn claims. See Freeman v. HoffmanLa Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 839–42 (Neb. 2000).
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. e. Just prior to
publication of this volume, one court declined to apply the doctrine whenever a
drug manufacturer supplied PPIs. See Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298,
301 (Okla. 1997). Nonetheless, this exception remains a distinctly minority
position. See, e.g., Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F.3d 281,
292–93 (6th Cir. 2015); Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ill.
1996).
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Just as this volume of the Restatement of Torts made its
debut, I elaborated on the curious twists and turns that had
occurred during the drafting process in relation to the
learned intermediary doctrine,112 before explaining at
length some of the serious flaws in proposals to recognize a
DTCA exception.113 Indeed, insofar as it effectively would
impose a penalty for engaging in commercial speech
whether or not it has any potential to mislead listeners,
state action crafting such an exception arguably violates the
First Amendment.114 Apart from a decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in 1999,115 several courts confronted
with efforts to adopt a DTCA exception have appropriately
declined to do so.116 One decade ago, however, the high
court of West Virginia took its concerns about such
advertising a step further and rejected the learned
intermediary doctrine altogether.117 Nonetheless, apart

112. See Noah, supra note 12, at 161–68.
113. See id. at 168–79; see also id. at 173 (“Proponents of an advertising
exception cannot rebut the two central rationales underlying the learned
intermediary doctrine: patients cannot lawfully purchase a prescription drug
without receiving authorization from a physician, and physicians are far better
situated than manufacturers to communicate with patients.”); id. at 175
(“[P]harmaceutical manufacturers would have to find a way of disseminating
[PPIs], ensure that these inserts contained references to all possible side effects
in nontechnical language, and, in the unlikely event that they managed to
design such an unassailable warning, hope that a jury would not decide that
continued advertising to consumers diluted the effectiveness of that warning.”);
id. at 180 (concluding that “no persuasive case exists for recognizing an
advertising exception”).
114. Cf. Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs.
Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 54–57 & nn.110–
12 (2011) (pointing out the U.S. Supreme Court’s surprising use of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in a drug advertising case); id. at 85–89
(explaining that most restrictions on DTCA would violate the First
Amendment).
115. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255–57, 1263 (N.J. 1999).
For my scathing critique of Perez, see Noah, supra note 103, at 897–905.
116. See, e.g., Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 950–51 (Ariz.
2016) (declining to recognize the DTCA exception, “which has been adopted only
in New Jersey”).
117. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 908–
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from these outliers, the rule continues to represent a
durable feature of failure-to-warn litigation involving
therapeutic products that remain accessible only through
health care professionals.118
2. Crafting an Exception to Cover Conflicted Physicians
When manufacturers of prescription products reward
physicians for patronizing their wares, at least some of the
rationales thought to justify the limited duty to warn break
down. In contrast to the exceptions referenced in the
Products Liability Restatement, however, this suggestion
has only recently and almost imperceptibly surfaced.119 In
10 (W. Va. 2007); see also Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174,
1214–24 (D.N.M. 2008) (predicting that the New Mexico courts would reject the
doctrine). See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Marketing Pharmaceutical
Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability of
Traditional Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 355–69, 386–87 (2009); Kyle T. Fogt, Note, The
Road Less Traveled: West Virginia’s Rejection of the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 34 J. CORP. L. 587 (2009).
In 2016, the state legislature announced its “intention . . . to adopt and allow
the development of a learned intermediary doctrine as a defense in cases based
upon claims of inadequate warning or instruction for prescription drugs or
medical devices,” W. VA. CODE § 55-7-30(b) (West 2018), which abrogated at
least the broader holding in Karl for future cases, see J.C. ex rel. Michelle C. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 814 S.E.2d 234, 238 n.9 (W. Va. 2018).
118. See In re Zimmer, NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 884 F.3d
746, 752 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluding that “there is good reason to think that
given the opportunity, the Wisconsin Supreme Court would join the vast
majority of state supreme courts and adopt the learned-intermediary doctrine”);
Diane S. Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1, § 2.5 (1998 & 2018 Supp.) (collecting
almost one hundred decisions from just the last decade); cf. Lars Noah, Treat
Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American Health
Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 378–83 (2006) (discussing the liability
questions that arise after powerful drugs switch to nonprescription status).
119. See LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 799 (4th ed. 2017) (“What, however, if a prescriber receives industry
funding—should that provide a new basis for recognizing an exception?”). One
year after publication of the Products Liability Restatement, a federal appellate
court largely dismissed the idea in a case involving a spinal fixation device in
spite of the fact that the surgeon received substantial sums as a consultant to
the manufacturer—including 25,000 shares of company stock and $250,000
annually—as his work related to a device unrelated to the plaintiff’s treatment.
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light of the previously discussed scope and consequences of
industry payments to health care professionals, coupled
with the general failure of other institutions to tackle the
resulting potential conflicts of interest, judges should
seriously consider recognizing a novel exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine in these circumstances.
In 2012, a pair of federal district courts squarely
confronted this question but arrived at conflicting results.120
Both cases considered failure-to-warn claims involving the
anti-inflammatory biologic Humira® (adalimumab), which
treats various autoimmune conditions such as rheumatoid
arthritis and psoriasis,121 and both judges had to guess
whether the highest courts in their respective states would
craft an exception when pharmaceutical manufacturers had
compensated prescribers, though they did so in tandem
with efforts by the plaintiffs to urge adoption of a DTCA
exception. The payments in these cases came from the
postapproval “Humira Efficacy Response Optimization”
(HERO) study, which the plaintiffs had portrayed as
amounting to little more than a seeding trial.122
See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 157, 163–64 (4th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the “learned intermediary doctrine
should not apply because Dr. Mathews was not independent of [the
manufacturer] in view of his financial connection with Danek as a consultant”).
120. Compare Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971–73 (S.D. Tex.
2012) (allowing for the possibility of recognizing such an exception), with
DiBartolo v. Abbott Labs., 914 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining
to do so). A decade earlier, another federal district court considered this issue,
though only insofar as it might have impacted proof of causation. See Miller v.
Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1129 n.108 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that the
prescribing physician’s consulting relationship with the defendant would not
provide the jury with a sufficient basis for disbelieving his testimony that he
already knew of the risk and would have selected the drug even with a fuller
warning), aff’d on other grounds, 356 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (10th Cir. 2004); see
also In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-MD-01928, 2011 WL 2117257, at
*4–5 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011) (same).
121. See Danny Hakim, The Humira Play: Raise High Prices, Steadily, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2018, at BU4 (“Humira is the best-selling prescription drug in
the world.”).
122. See Brief of Petitioners at 18–20, Jones v. Abbott Labs., No. M201300769-SC-R23-CQ (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2013) (on file with author); id. at 34
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In Murthy v. Abbott Laboratories,123 a federal district
court in Texas endorsed the idea of an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine when prescribers receive
drug industry compensation. Referencing some of the
research and commentary available at that time, 124 the
court explained that such payments undercut assumptions
supporting the rule.125 The federal judge in Murthy plainly
felt emboldened to take this step by a then-recent opinion of
the state’s intermediate appellate court favoring the DTCA
exception,126 but the Texas Supreme Court soon thereafter
reversed, reiterating its adherence to the learned
intermediary rule at least given the facts of that case. 127
Although Judge Ellison’s analysis of the issue hardly
depended on the state appellate court’s earlier decision, the
intervening signal from the state’s high court suggests that
Murthy offers little precedential value for those advocating

(referring to the “payment by Abbott of patient ‘bounties’ to prescribing
physicians”).
123. 847 F. Supp. 2d 958.
124. See id. at 972–73 nn.5–6.
125. See id. at 971 (“[W]hen a physician is compensated by a drug company,
some of the assumptions underlying the learned intermediary doctrine no
longer hold.”); id. at 973 (“[W]hen a physician receives compensation or gifts
from drug companies, his or her role as the neutral decision-maker may be
diminished.”).
126. See id. at 971 (citing Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 499
(Tex. App. 2010)). Separately, however, the court dismissed most of the
complaint because of a statutory presumption of adequacy for FDA-approved
warnings. See id. at 973–77. Upon further consideration and review of
additional evidence, the court vacated this part of its order and allowed the
plaintiff to file an amended complaint. See Murthy v. Abbott Labs., No. 4:11-cv105, 2012 WL 6020157 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2012).
127. See Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 162–64 (Tex. 2012)
(declining to decide, however, “whether Texas law should recognize a DTC
advertising exception when a prescription drug manufacturer distributes
intentionally misleading information directly to patients or prospective
patients” or “any of the other exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine”);
see also id. at 162 n.22 (calling out Murthy for its erroneous prediction about
Texas law).
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an exception whenever drug companies pay prescribers.128
Just nine months after Murthy, in DiBartolo v. Abbott
Laboratories,129 a federal district court in New York
declined to recognize an exception to the learned
intermediary rule for physician payments. Judge Buchwald
simply pointed to the lack of any local precedent, adding
that the “plaintiff has not demonstrated that Murthy is part
of any trend supporting an exception.”130 In an
accompanying footnote, the judge elaborated somewhat
confusingly about why she remained unpersuaded on the
merits:
Looking more broadly to [the doctrine’s] rationale, plaintiff has not
demonstrated that an exception . . . would be justified even if one
assumes that physicians compensated by Abbott would be more
likely to prescribe Humira than to prescribe a competitor drug.
Such physicians would not be absolved of their duty to prescribe
drugs to patients only when medically appropriate. It is not clear,
moreover, that manufacturer-compensated physicians would in
fact neglect their professional duties to an extent that would
undermine [the learned intermediary doctrine].131

128. Nonetheless, one federal court subsequently relied on Murthy in
declining to apply the learned intermediary rule to dismiss a failure-to-warn
claim asserted by a subject allegedly injured while participating in a clinical
trial of an investigational hepatitis C drug. See Rodriguez v. Gilead Scis., Inc.,
No. 2:14-CV-324, 2015 WL 236621, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2015) (explaining
that the plaintiff had pled that his personal physician and investigator “was not
acting within a physician-patient relationship during the clinical study but was
rather an extension of Gilead, incentivized to act as a drug marketer rather
than as a treating physician”).
129. 914 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
130. Id. at 616 (adding that the learned intermediary “doctrine [is] firmly
established in New York law”).
131. Id. at 616 n.6. This passage made an assumption but then questioned
the assumed premise, mixed unresolved questions of facts peculiar to the case
before the court and broader (“legislative”) factual disputes about the potential
influence of industry payments (ignoring the page long footnote in Murthy that
discussed some of the relevant research), and implausibly suggested that a
physician’s decision to prescribe a medically inappropriate drug would be so
wildly unforeseeable to the company that paid him or her as to represent a
superseding cause (as opposed to giving the plaintiff a parallel malpractice
claim).
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Separately, in responding to Abbott’s motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff conceded that she had not yet discovered whether
her physician had received any payments from the
manufacturer of Humira.132 DiBartolo, therefore, hardly
represents a carefully reasoned rejection of the payment
exception, though a couple of months later it helped to
persuade a federal judge in Massachusetts not to follow
Murthy’s lead in still another Humira case.133 Otherwise,
however, the issue has attracted essentially no further
attention.134

132. See id. at 616 (“[P]laintiff’s allegations that Abbott compensated Dr. Cui
are completely speculative, based entirely on what Abbott allegedly did in other
cases involving other physicians.”). I have found only one commentator who
previously has addressed this question. See Kate Greenwood, Physician
Conflicts of Interest in Court: Beyond the “Independent Physician” Litigation
Heuristic, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 789–94, 815–19 (2014). Although she
usefully pointed out that the published opinion in Murthy represented a
watered-down approach to the learned intermediary issue when compared with
the court’s original (superseded) opinion, she then dismissed even that
discussion as dicta, see id. at 763–65, failing to realize that the court later
revisited its decision to dismiss on other grounds, see supra note 126. Ms.
Greenwood entirely ignored the contemporaneous decision DiBartolo and never
mentioned seeding trials by name.
133. See Calisi v. Abbott Labs., No. 11-10671-DJC, 2013 WL 5462274, at *3
(D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2013); see also Calisi v. Abbott Labs., No. 11-10671-DJC,
2013 WL 5441355, at *17 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2013) (treating as irrelevant,
though with no additional discussion, the alleged “financial incentives that
Abbott provided to Dr. Pastan”); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD1596, 06-CV-3457, 2010 WL 348276, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (rejecting a
similar earlier effort under Illinois law).
134. Five years ago, the Houston-based plaintiffs’ attorney involved in both of
the federal Humira lawsuits contacted me about this issue, attaching the briefs
of the parties in a case then pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court. See
E-mail from Andy Vickery to author (June 5, 2013, 18:51 E.D.T.) (on file with
author). As explained in my reply to him, “I was intrigued by your suggested LI
exception in cases of co. payments to Drs. and will be curious to see how it all
turns out.” E-mail from author to Andy Vickery (June 6, 2013, 07:19 E.D.T.) (on
file with author). In further response, he added that “we have unbelievable
record to change law in that arena in numerous Humira cases. Just tried case
to verdict in Chicago. Jury cringed, visibly, when depo of prescribing doctor was
played and she testified (a) was ok to take Abbott money, and (b) ok not to tell
patient about it.” E-mail from Andy Vickery to author (June 6, 2013, 08:42
E.D.T.) (on file with author). This use of such evidence at trial struck me,
however, as more about atmosphere than doctrinal change, and it also
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Although the learned intermediary doctrine is often
framed in terms of the greater relative expertise of health
care professionals, courts also assume that these
professionals will exercise their judgment independently. 135
When that assumption no longer holds true by virtue of the
actions of therapeutic product manufacturers, then the
latter parties arguably should owe heightened duties to
communicate with patients.136 Alternatively, plaintiffs
could argue that overpromotion by the seller had
undermined an otherwise adequate warning directed to
their physicians.137 In the context of promotion by
remuneration as opposed to misinformation, however,
prescribers will have a greater inclination to deny that gifts
or grants in any way polluted their judgment. Removing the
learned intermediary doctrine in the event of payments to
prescribers offers a more straightforward approach.
represented the last that I have heard to even hint at any successful efforts at
using such an exception.
135. See Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharm., 526 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2008); Eck
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the
assumption that the prescriber “exercise[d] independent judgment”); Marcus v.
Specific Pharm., 77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509–10 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (“There is no reason to
believe that a physician would . . . substitute for his own judgment that of a
drug manufacturer.”).
136. Cf. Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned
Intermediary: The Case for Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 670–76, 689–94 (2007) (proposing a different exception
on similar grounds).
137. See, e.g., Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010);
Brown v. Glaxo, Inc., 790 So. 2d 35, 40–41 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Holley v.
Burroughs Wellcome Co., 348 S.E.2d 772, 777 (N.C. 1986); see also Hyman &
Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 111–12, 121–22 (Ky. 2008); cf.
Patteson v. AstraZeneca, LP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35–37 (D.D.C. 2012), app.
dismissed, 2014 WL 3013767 (D.C. Cir. 2014); id. at 36 (“Repeated visits by
sales representatives to a physician regarding a pharmaceutical drug alone,
however, do not constitute overpromotion—there must be a link between these
visits and misinformation that would make the prior warnings ineffective.”); In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 18, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In
unusual cases, courts have found that a drug manufacturer’s excessive
promotion of its product may negate or call into question operation of the
learned intermediary doctrine.”), aff’d sub nom. Head v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 F.
App’x 819, 821 (2d Cir. 2010).
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If courts adopted this exception, then they also would
have to resolve various practical issues.138 Mere inclusion in
the federal disclosure database would not suffice for several
reasons: (1) it suffers from inaccuracies,139 (2) it includes
providers who have received fairly small gifts and
payments,140 and (3) it covers a wide range of corporate
donors. Plaintiffs would have to undertake discovery to
confirm suspicions based on the federal database or some
other source; courts may want to define a threshold amount
before they would consider the medical judgments of

138. See Greenwood, supra note 132, at 817 (“The factual questions raised
when a plaintiff plausibly pleads that his or her doctor had a financial
relationship with the defendant manufacturer are many.”); id. at 822 (“In
personal injury cases where there is a financial relationship between a
physician and the defendant manufacturer, the question of the physician’s
independence would become one of fact, to be determined in light of factors such
as the nature, size, and scope of the relationship.”).
139. See Neil M. Kirschner et al., Health Policy Basics: The Physician
Payment Sunshine Act and the Open Payments Program, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 519, 520 (2014) (discussing opportunities to dispute information before the
CMS); Loftus & Walker, supra note 40, at B3 (reporting that a sizeable fraction
of recipients lodged disputes for the first full year of reports, but that the AMA
nonetheless complained about the failure to otherwise validate the data);
Schencker & Richards, supra note 43, at C1 (The AMA “has long criticized the
accuracy of the data.”).
140. Federal law uses a $10 (or $100 aggregate annual) threshold, see supra
note 39 and accompanying text, while some states opted for thresholds of $25 or
$50, see Susan Chimonas et al., Show Us the Money: Lessons in Transparency
from State Pharmaceutical Marketing Disclosure Laws, 45 HEALTH SERV. RES.
98, 102 (2010). In addition, the likely impact of a payment might vary
depending on what percentage of a particular provider’s income it would
represent; for highly paid specialists, getting $500 from a company would
amount to petty cash, while an overextended general practitioner in a rural
area might genuinely appreciate such generosity. Cf. Bimal H. Ashar et al.,
Prevalence and Determinants of Physician Participation in Conducting
Pharmaceutical-Sponsored Clinical Trials and Lectures, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 1140, 1144 (2004) (“Our study suggests that dissatisfaction with income
partially explains participation in these activities.”). Lastly, even modest
individual payments may cumulate and become more consequential when
viewed in the aggregate. See Loftus, supra note 41, at A1 (“Consulting and
speaking fees are an important source of income for some physicians, who can
be paid tens of thousands of dollars a year for such services.”). See generally
Thompson, supra note 44, at 574.

2018]

DOCTORS ON THE TAKE

899

physicians potentially corrupted;141 and even sizeable
payments would have to get linked to choices about
prescribing or use that allegedly resulted in an injury to a
particular patient. 142 Seeding trials might simplify the task
of satisfying such evidentiary burdens,143 while more
general consulting agreements with the parent company of
a subsidiary producing therapeutic products selected by a
health care professional suggest that such inquires could
become rather complicated.144

141. See Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(“[T]he Court would have to examine the factual circumstances surrounding the
compensation of Murthy’s physician in order to evaluate whether application of
the learned intermediary doctrine is appropriate.”). The industry codes, though
voluntary, might help in this task. Cf. Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522,
526–27 (Nev. 1991) (upholding the admissibility of an ANSI standard adopted
after an accident). Although they use the term “modest” and a rough threshold
of $100 per gift, and do so for purposes of a prohibition, see supra notes 9, 19–
20, and accompanying text, courts could decide that aggregate annual payments
to a physician exceeding such thresholds would deprive donors of the learned
intermediary doctrine’s protections.
142. Cf. Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (granting defendant summary judgment because the plaintiff had no
evidence linking the company’s sales calls to decisions by his physicians to
prescribe OxyContin® (oxycodone)). See generally supra note 5 (explaining the
heightened risks associated with new drugs when initially launched).
143. See Eichenwald & Kolata, supra note 13, at 1 (“Doctors with money at
stake may persuade patients to take drugs that are inappropriate or even
unsafe.”); see also Krumholz et al., supra note 66, at 1105 (pointing out that,
during the seeding trial of Neurontin, which had enrolled 2759 subjects, “11
patients died, 73 experienced serious adverse events, and 997 experienced less
serious adverse effects”). Conversely, in seeding trials and similar studies,
sponsors typically would supply consent forms with detailed risk disclosures
and an expectation that physician-investigators get signatures from their
enrolled patient-subjects. See, e.g., Murthy, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 964. In those
circumstances, an exception to the learned intermediary rule would have little
impact on sellers.
144. Cf. Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 164 (4th Cir. 1999)
(pointing out that “Dr. Mathews’ consulting relationship with Danek involved
devices other than internal fixation devices” used on the plaintiff). Indeed,
product sellers might simply respond by funneling more of their grants to
doctors through seemingly independent third-party organizations such as
patient advocacy groups. See Noah, supra note 96, at 290–94; Thomas Ginsberg,
Donations Tie Drug Firms and Nonprofits, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 28, 2006, at
A1 (“[M]any patient groups and drug companies maintain close, multimillion-
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Critics of the DTCA exception worried that it might
prompt a counterproductive response. If faced with the
threat of expanded tort liability, prescription drug
manufacturers would not supply warnings to patients;
instead, they would cease engaging in such promotional
campaigns, thereby depriving patients of potentially useful,
even if incomplete, information.145 Proponents of the DTCA
exception might not have minded such a response,146 so it
depends on whether one sees anything of value in pitching
prescription products to patients. This question seems less
dollar relationships while disclosing limited or no details about the ties. . . . For
drug companies, patient groups carry credibility that the industry sometimes
lacks to target patients and ‘opinion leaders’ who drive prescriptions, and
hence, sales.”); Charles Ornstein & Tracy Weber, Ties Between Drugmakers,
Advocacy Groups Probed, WASH. POST, May 9, 2012, at A2 (focusing on the
American Pain Foundation); see also Emily Kopp et al., Drug Companies Paid
$116 Million to Patient Advocacy Groups in 2015 Alone, New Data Suggests,
PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/drugcompanies-pay-116-million-to-patient-advocacy-groups-in-2015-alone-new-datasuggests. As a team of CMS officials wrote, “transfers of value can occur
indirectly—through specialty societies, for example—when funding originates
with manufacturers.” Shantanu Agrawal et al., The Sunshine Act—Effects on
Physicians, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2054, 2056 (2013).
145. See Noah, supra note 12, at 177–78; id. at 144 (“[F]aced with the
prospect of significantly enhanced tort liability, pharmaceutical manufacturers
may choose to discontinue most promotions directed to persons other than
medical professionals.”); id. at 169 (“[R]ecognition of an exception in such cases
might be counterproductive insofar as manufacturers react to the expanded
duty to warn by conveying far less rather than more information to patients.”);
id. at 178 (“Direct advertising encourages active participation by consumers in
prescribing decisions, a favorable development that courts should not ‘reward’
by expanding the tort duties of drug manufacturers and, thereby, discouraging
such advertising in the future.”); see also id. at 179 (“[C]ritics of the learned
intermediary rule often emphasize the value of communicating additional
information to consumers and then simply assume that expanding the duty to
warn will best promote this goal. Eliminating the doctrine altogether would do
so, but carving out only an advertising exception may do nothing to improve
communication with consumers.”).
146. See id. at 170 (“[P]roponents of an advertising exception seem to rest
their position on what they perceive as crass, profit-motivated advertising of
prescription drugs. Once pharmaceutical manufacturers stoop to direct
consumer advertising, the argument goes, they no longer deserve the special
treatment that they have enjoyed under tort law.”); cf. id. at 177 n.135 (“Even
critics concede that direct advertising provides significant valuable information
to consumers.”).
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contestable here: if faced with an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine, manufacturers would probably not
start supplying warnings to patients; instead, they would
stop lavishing gifts and money on physicians.147 Unlike
other forms of industry advertising directed toward health
care professionals, rewarding those who select a company’s
therapeutic products lacks any communicative value.148
Some physicians might complain about the loss of these
bonuses and mementos of appreciation,149 but in no sense
would patients find themselves worse off. Insofar as this

147. If, instead, manufacturers did supply risk information directly to
patients, then another rationale favoring the learned intermediary rule would
come into play—namely, concerns about intruding upon the doctor-patient
relationship. See id. at 157 (“[W]arnings that contradict information supplied by
the physician will undermine the patient’s trust in the physician’s judgment.”).
Again, however, in cases where a prescriber has a conflict of interest, rattling a
patient’s naive confidence in the judgment of their physician might represent
“just what the doctor ordered.”
148. See Lars Noah, Permission to Speak Freely?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
248, 250–54 (2014) (discussing the constitutional protections that apply when
companies seek to communicate potentially valuable therapeutic information to
physicians); see also Noah, supra note 114, at 68–84 (elaborating). Although
efforts to discourage companies from handing out money in exchange for
prescribing would not seem to raise any First Amendment issues, trying to
punish companies for bankrolling others to communicate (or collect) information
might do so. See id. at 84–85 n.217. Nonetheless, companies argue that gifts
represent an essential part of their communicative encounter, providing a
means for their agents to “get a foot in the door” of busy physicians, and that
otherwise they could not effectively deliver their constitutionally protected
messages. See Gardiner Harris, Minnesota Limit on Gifts to Doctors May Catch
on, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A25 (reporting such arguments in response to
one state’s move to ban free meals for physicians); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552, 578–79 (2011) (“Vermont may be displeased that detailers who
use prescriber-identifying information are effective in promoting brand-name
drugs. . . . The State may not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public
debate in a preferred direction.”); IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d
163, 173 (D.N.H. 2007) (quoting an anecdote about a sales rep regularly
delivering coffee to a clinic and then complaining to a nurse that this had failed
to increase their use of her company’s drug), rev’d, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
149. See Chimonas et al., supra note 72, at 186 (“Regulatory efforts irritated
the physicians [participating in focus groups]. They resented limitations on
entertainment and other personal-use gifts . . . . They particularly objected to
excluding spouses from industry-sponsored events.”); see also supra note 3
(explaining that some doctors miss getting gifts from patients).
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exception would have the effect of discouraging companies
from giving sizeable gifts to persons responsible for
selecting therapeutic products, so much the better.
Furthermore, if companies want to continue engaging
in generous outreach efforts to the medical community,
then they would have a ready means of fulfilling their
expanded duty to warn. Unlike the proposed DTCA
exception, which—contrary to the misconceptions of some
courts and commentators—could not get satisfied simply by
communicating fuller risk information through that
medium,150 manufacturers have the power to contractually
obligate recipients of their largesse to disseminate warnings
to patients under the care of those (and only those) health
care professionals.151 In the event of a physician’s neglect in
doing so, the manufacturer could seek indemnification if
later held liable for failing to warn a patient directly. Thus,
another common objection lodged against suggested
exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine has no
particular force in this setting.
Product sellers may face vicarious liability for the
tortious conduct of their employees.152 These issues have
150. See Noah, supra note 12, at 174 (“Once the duty to warn expands, risk
information contained in the advertisements would not satisfy a drug
manufacturer’s duty to warn patients directly.”); Noah, supra note 103, at 901–
03; id. at 900 (“What the plaintiffs wanted, however, was not clearer risk
information in advertisements that they may not have seen (or remembered);
instead, they sought printed warnings to accompany the drugs when later
dispensed to them.”).
151. Cf. Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348, 1365–69 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that a vaccine manufacturer had satisfied its duty to warn by
delegating to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention the
responsibility for disseminating patient labeling). But cf. In re Vioxx Cases, No.
JCCP 4247, 2006 WL 6305292, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006) (rejecting
the argument that the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply to a
prescriber previously paid by Merck to serve as an investigator and speaker,
adding that “if such payments alone sufficed, a manufacturer would have to
obtain the patient list of every physician it pays for research in order to
somehow provide direct warnings”).
152. See, e.g., Delfino v. Griffo, 257 P.3d 917, 928–29 (N.M. 2011) (allowing
vicarious liability claims to proceed against the employers of pharmaceutical

2018]

DOCTORS ON THE TAKE

903

become more important as industry salespersons
occasionally insinuate themselves in patient care.153 When
drug and device manufacturers hire practicing physicians
to serve as consultants, speakers, or investigators, one can
make the argument that these doctors have become agents
of the manufacturer.154 Nonetheless, because the physicians
sales representatives who purchased drinks for a doctor’s office staff, one of
whom later caused a fatal accident); cf. Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d
1374, 1381–83 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that sales agent would not face
personal liability for failing to warn physicians of prescription drug risks).
153. See, e.g., Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharm., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410, 418–19
(Ct. App. 2001) (allowing an invasion of privacy claim against a drug
manufacturer where a breast cancer patient had not consented to the presence
of one of its salesmen during an exam as part of a preceptorship); Hurley v.
Heart Physicians, P.C., 898 A.2d 777, 787–88 (Conn. 2006) (allowing a claim
against the manufacturer where one of its salesmen allegedly had adjusted the
settings of an implanted pacemaker in an improper manner); see also
Christiana C. Jacxsens et al., Beyond the Basics: Expanding Theories of
Liability and Defenses for Claims Involving Medical Device Sales
Representatives, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1087, 1112–16, 1143–50 (2013);
Abigail Zuger, Fever Pitch: Getting Doctors to Prescribe Is Big Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A1 (“[T]hey begin to blend into the health care team.
Salesmen who sell surgical devices have long been present at operations to
guide doctors using new equipment . . . .”); id. (Harrisburg Hospital’s “Dr.
Shaughnessy said he once found residents actually presenting cases to a
pharmaceutical representative for treatment advice, apparently finding him
more pleasant and accessible than their supervising physicians.”).
154. See Margolis, supra note 71, at 1236 (worrying about “the loss of
autonomy as physicians become the agents of pharmaceutical manufacturers”);
id. at 1237 (arguing that seeding trials pose such concerns even more clearly);
Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 25, 2007, at 64 (recounting
that the author, a practicing psychiatrist, had earned almost $30,000 in extra
income one year on the speakers circuit pitching Wyeth’s antidepressant
Effexor® (venlafaxine)). Thus, when a company enlists independent physicians
to communicate information that it could not share, the government has on rare
occasions brought conspiracy charges against the health care professional. See
Alex Berenson, Indictment of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2006, at A1 (reporting the arrest of a psychiatrist accused of conspiring
with the manufacturer of Xyrem® (gamma hydroxybutyrate) to publicize offlabel uses of this narcolepsy drug at continuing medical education events);
Weber & Ornstein, supra note 37, at G1 (noting that this physician pled guilty
to a misdemeanor count of drug misbranding and got sentenced to a year of
probation before committing suicide); cf. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d
149, 156–58, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (dismissing prosecution of the sales rep
involved in that case on First Amendment grounds). In some cases, the
arrangements become almost incestuous. See Thomas, supra note 36, at A1 (“In
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technically would qualify as independent contractors rather
than regular employees,155 manufacturers normally would
not have to fear vicarious liability.156 In particular, courts
have rejected efforts to hold pharmaceutical companies that
sponsor clinical trials vicariously liable for the actions of
principal investigators.157
addition to paying high-prescribing doctors to speak on behalf of Subsys, Insys
also hired the doctors’ family members.”); id. (“[I]n at least two cases, the
company hired the adult children of top doctors to serve as their parents’ sales
representatives.”); cf. Weber & Ornstein, supra note 37, at G1 (repeating
allegations that a frequent prescriber of the antipsychotic Zyprexa® (olanzapine)
felt underappreciated by the payments he had received from the manufacturer
for speaking engagements and switched his loyalties after Eli Lilly refused to
hire his son as a sales rep).
155. See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 163–64 (4th Cir. 1999)
(“[I]f Dr. Mathews were [not merely a consultant but] an employee of Danek or
so closely related to Danek that he could not exercise independent professional
judgment, a question could legitimately be raised as to whether he was an
intermediary. The resolution of that complex question would depend on the
nature of the relationship between the manufacturer and the physician . . . .”);
cf. Lenahan v. Univ. of Chi., 808 N.E.2d 1078, 1083–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(departing from the general rule that hospitals have no independent duty to
secure patient consent in a case involving medical research).
156. See, e.g., Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio
1991) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a physician became the agent of a
drug manufacturer for accepting $15 to enroll patients in a trial of a
prescription smoking-cessation product so as to make the learned intermediary
doctrine inapplicable). See generally Pusey v. Bator, 762 N.E.2d 968, 972 (Ohio
2002) (explaining that “an employer is generally not liable for the negligent acts
of an independent contractor”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM.
LAW INST. 1965).
157. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 548–50 (6th Cir. 2006);
Suthers v. Amgen Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Kernke v.
Menninger Clinic, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121–22, 1124 (D. Kan. 2001)
(applying the learned intermediary doctrine in granting summary judgment to
the manufacturer of an investigational drug for schizophrenia, adding that the
other named defendants owed duties to the subject); see also Vinion v. Amgen
Inc., 272 F. App’x 582, 584 (9th Cir. 2008) (agreeing that the consent documents
made no promise of continued access to the study drug at the conclusion of the
clinical trial and that the investigator was not the manufacturer’s apparent
agent); cf. id. at 585–87 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a reasonable
jury could regard the investigator as an implied agent of the manufacturer
sufficient to commit the companies to supply Enbrel® (etanercept) free of
charge). But cf. Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713, 718–19 & n.6 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (allowing battery claims to proceed against a manufacturer of
diethylstilbesterol for sponsoring a clinical trial at a teaching hospital that
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Even without the prospect of vicarious liability,
physicians paid to market prescription drugs and devices
might find themselves treated as members of the chain of
distribution. Although health care professionals need not
fear strict liability for defective products that they use or
recommend,158 they might open themselves to such claims if
viewed instead as conduits for the sale of drugs and
devices.159 The more forgiving standards used for judging
claims of professional negligence would give way to the
more demanding standards of products liability; moreover,
physicians on the (intermittent) payroll of sellers might face
the prospect of liability for any defects introduced upstream
of them (typically at the level of the finished good
manufacturer) even if they had no way of knowing that
such flaws existed in the products.160 The ultimate financial
responsibility would flow back to those manufacturers—at
least barring bankruptcy—by the operation of express or
implied rights of indemnification,161 but, depending on the
language of their contracts with such consultants,162 they

administered the drug to hundreds of its patients without their knowledge),
aff’d mem. after further proceedings, 727 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1984); Darke v.
Estate of Isner, No. 022194E, 2005 WL 3729113, at *14 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov.
15, 2005) (holding that evidence of a financial relationship with the principal
investigator might suffice to make gene therapy trial sponsor vicariously liable).
158. See Noah, supra note 103, at 918–19; see also id. at 923–24 (explaining
that hospitals enjoy a similar exemption).
159. Cf. Jacxsens et al., supra note 153, at 1136–40 (explaining that
salespersons employed by a company might get recharacterized as downstream
sellers subject to strict liability).
160. See Heredia v. Johnson, 827 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (D. Nev. 1993)
(rejecting a pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment on a strict liability claim
for an alleged failure to transmit the manufacturer’s warning to a consumer
about a prescription drug’s risks); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 6(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (limiting downstream liability for prescription
products to manufacturing defects); Noah, supra note 103, at 917–22
(discussing ambiguities in this provision).
161. See Godoy v. Abamaster of Miami, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 301, 306–07 (App.
Div. 2003).
162. Cf. Michael D. Tomatz, Note, Prozac: Is It the Next Rising Giant in
Products Liability?, 12 REV. LITIG. 705, 711 & n.41, 713–14 (1993) (noting Eli
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also may now face what amounts to vicarious liability for
the failures (negligent or innocent) by health care
professionals to pass along adequate warnings in a way
that the learned intermediary rule would have barred and
made solely a matter of potential malpractice liability. 163 If
this convoluted scenario represents a plausible account of
how responsibility for failures to warn patients ultimately
might get charged to therapeutic product manufacturers,
then why not accomplish the same result more forthrightly
by recognizing an exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine in cases of physician payments?
III. CONCLUSION
The pharmaceutical and medical device industries
aggressively market their wares to health care
professionals, and gift giving has become a fixed feature of
this process. Most observers regard offers of financial
incentives to select therapeutic products as crossing the
line, but the practice has continued in different guises.
Various institutions have taken fairly tepid stabs at
combating inappropriate gifts and payments to physicians:
more than a quarter century of voluntary industry
guidelines and ethical codes for medical professionals,
fifteen years of nonbinding federal guidelines, or the still
newer state and then federal reporting laws. Selfregulation, threats of prosecution, and transparency
initiatives may have curbed the most egregious abuses, but
manufacturers always have found clever new ways of
Lilly’s promise to indemnify physicians sued for prescribing the antidepressant
Prozac® (fluoxetine)).
163. See, e.g., Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla.
1989) (affirming summary judgment for a drug manufacturer on failure-to-warn
claim notwithstanding prescriber’s alleged failure to share that information
with his patient); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1043 (Kan. 1990) (granting
summary judgment to the manufacturer of an IUD where the physician had
neglected to hand out its patient labeling in favor of a homemade leaflet);
Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1119–22 (N.J. 1989) (absolving drug
manufacturer but remanding claim that physician failed to warn patient).
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purchasing the loyalty of prescribers.
As presently configured, tort law has essentially
nothing to say about industry payments to physicians.
Fairly minor modifications to doctrine could, however, make
a big difference. Courts could include potential conflicts of
interest as material information that physicians must
reveal when securing consent from their patients, but such
professional negligence claims would offer a difficult
mechanism for effectuating such disclosures and, therefore,
probably not do much to discourage gift taking. Instead,
courts could expand the duties of manufacturers. By
depriving therapeutic product sellers of the learned
intermediary doctrine when they provide financial
incentives to those intermediaries, manufacturers of
prescription drugs and medical devices would face enhanced
exposure to inadequate warning claims. The prospect of
having to communicate risk information directly to patients
might make companies think twice before lavishing gifts
and payments on physicians, which in turn would help to
ensure that those learned intermediaries continue to serve
the best interests of their patients.

